Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
作者による説明(英語の原文)
MCP server for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in and audit-log triage (read-only by default)
この3つを1つのスコアにまとめることはしません。意見、測定、人気はそれぞれ別のものだからです。
このサーバーのやさしい解説はまだ書いていません。以下はレジストリから読み取った事実です。
使っているAIアプリを選んで、設定をコピーしてください。
必要なもの
どのアプリを使っていますか?
上でアプリを選んでください。選んだアプリを覚えておくので、次からはボタンに「…にインストール」と表示されます。
Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config を開き、claude_desktop_config.json にこれを貼り付けます
{
"mcpServers": {
"entraadm": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"entraadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}ターミナルでこれを実行します
claude mcp add entraadm -- uvx entraadm-mcpプロジェクトの .cursor/mcp.json、または ~/.cursor/mcp.json に貼り付けます
{
"mcpServers": {
"entraadm": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"entraadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}ブラウザがアプリを開いてよいか確認し、そのあとアプリが設定を表示して確認を求めます。キーの値は空欄のままなので、自分で入力してください。
プロジェクトの .vscode/mcp.json に貼り付けます
{
"servers": {
"entraadm": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"entraadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}ブラウザがアプリを開いてよいか確認し、そのあとアプリが設定を表示して確認を求めます。キーの値は空欄のままなので、自分で入力してください。
これはパソコンで動くサーバーですが、ChatGPTがつなげるのはインターネット上のサーバーだけです。ほかのアプリを選んでください。
選んだアプリは、この端末のCookieに保存されます。アカウントは不要です。
この設定は、作者のレジストリ登録情報から作成しています。READMEと違う場合は、READMEに従ってください。
パソコンで動くサーバーです。インストールすると、ツール一覧がAIアプリに表示されます。
誰でも見られる情報をチェックしており、コードは読んでいません。当てはまらない項目は数に入れていません。 · 2026年11月9日にチェック
レジストリ名は、リポジトリを所有するGitHubアカウント shigechika で確認済みです
このリポジトリはまだGitHubから読み取っていません
このリポジトリはまだGitHubから読み取っていません
これはパソコンで動くため、インターネット上のエンドポイントはありません
パソコンで動き、代わりにローカルの設定を使います
パソコンで動くサーバーです。ツール一覧を読み取れるのは、インターネット上のエンドポイントがある場合だけです
レジストリでこのカテゴリにある有効なすべてのサーバーと比較しています。スターは、公開者がリポジトリの所有者である場合だけ数えます。
当てはまる基本チェック1項目のうち1項目に合格しました。コードは読んでいません。キーやトークンを追加する前に、サーバーがどんなアクセスを求めているかを確認し、必要な権限だけを持つキーを使ってください。
レジストリには必須のキーは載っていません。ただし、最初に使うときにサインインを求めるサーバーもあります。
あなたのパソコンで動きます。必要なときにAIアプリが起動し、データは作者のサーバーを通りません(サーバー自体がオンラインサービスを呼び出す場合を除きます)。
GitHubリポジトリの最終更新は–、最新バージョン(1.10.1)がレジストリに届いたのは7 日前です。
Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor、VS CodeなどのMCP対応アプリで使えます。パソコンにPython (uv)も必要です。
同じカテゴリには:Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, bot2bot
同じカテゴリで、ほかの作者が作ったサーバー。スターの多い順。
カードの見方:↓ 週あたりのダウンロードi★ GitHubスターi3つの柱:レビュー · チェック · 利用状況i更新=最新バージョンをレジストリに公開した日i
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
作者のリポジトリから書かれたとおりにコピーしたものです。PopNx MCPは内容を確認・推奨していません。HTML、画像、スクリプトは取り除いています。リンクはこのサイトの外へ移動します。
English | 日本語
MCP server for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in and audit-log triage, plus the two Azure-side questions a morning patrol asks with the same credential: are our Azure VMs backed up, and is Microsoft 365 itself degraded right now. Read-only, except for one opt-in tool that signs a compromised account out everywhere.
Microsoft ships an official MCP Server for Enterprise for Entra ID data. It is a good fit for an interactive admin at a keyboard, and is not a fit for an unattended triage bot:
az login) fallback for local development.GET/schema-discovery calls against Microsoft Graph. That is flexible for a human, and awkward to put behind an allow-list for an automated triage profile. entraadm-mcp exposes seventeen fixed, read-only tools instead (plus one opt-in write, below).status/errorCode server-side, and has no built-in password-spray view. signin_failure_stats aggregates client-side and flags IPs with failed sign-ins against many distinct users — the pattern Entra's per-account smart lockout does not catch on its own.| Tool | What it answers |
|---|---|
health_check | Is Graph reachable, and can this credential read sign-in logs? |
get_user | Is this account enabled, synced from on-prem, and what are its licenses? |
signin_logs | Why did this user's sign-in fail (or succeed), with the AADSTS code translated? |
signin_failure_stats | Tenant-wide failure aggregation: top error codes, users, apps, source IPs, and password-spray suspects |
signin_success_stats | Tenant-wide success aggregation by source IP: IPs shared by several accounts, legacy-auth (SMTP/IMAP) successes — the view that finds a breach |
compromise_suspects | Which accounts were probably taken over: an outside IP that sprayed many accounts and got into some (spray_breaches), successes from outside the home countries (foreign_successes, high when over a legacy protocol, through Azure CLI / PowerShell, or from 3+ countries within 24 hours), and Microsoft's own risky users when the tenant has Entra ID P2 |
signin_by_ip | Every sign-in from one source IP: who got in from it, who was tried, and when |
directory_audits | Who changed what in the directory (block/unblock, attribute edits), and when? |
get_user_auth_methods | Is MFA actually registered for this account? |
list_subscriptions | Which Azure subscriptions can this credential see? (ARM) |
vm_backup_status | Which Azure VMs are backed up by Azure Backup, did the last backup succeed, and is any recovery point stale? (ARM) |
vm_backup_policies | What schedule and retention do the Azure VM backup policies have? (ARM) |
vm_activity | Did someone restart this Azure VM, or did Azure (host failure, maintenance)? Activity log and Resource Health for a time window (ARM) |
m365_service_health | Is a Microsoft 365 service degraded, and which incidents and advisories are open? |
audit_log_search_start | What did this account (or this IP) do in OneDrive/SharePoint, Exchange and Entra? Submits a Microsoft Purview audit log search, which runs for some minutes in Microsoft 365 |
audit_log_search_result | That search's status, then its records: counts by operation, service, record type, user and client IP (with first/last seen) and a trimmed record list |
daily_brief | One-call summary combining m365_service_health, signin_failure_stats, directory_audits and compromise_suspects (counts and top 5) |
Every tool above is read-only. audit_log_search_start creates a saved audit search object (the one audit_log_search_result then reads) and changes no directory, mailbox or file data. One state-changing tool exists and is off by default:
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
revoke_sign_in_sessions | Signs one account out everywhere (Graph revokeSignInSessions: refresh tokens and session cookies are invalidated). For a confirmed compromise. Registered only when ENTRAADM_ENABLE_REVOKE_SESSIONS=1 |
It looks the account up by exact userPrincipalName first and refuses a guest. Every result has the same keys, including revoked and not_covered: it does not disable the account, reset the password or remove MFA methods, and access tokens already issued keep working until they expire (typically about an hour). revoked is true when Graph confirmed it, false when nothing was done (a refusal, a deadline before the request was sent, a 4xx from Graph), and null when the outcome is unknown (a response lost to a network error, a 5xx after the retries, a deadline after the request was sent, an unreadable success answer); calling again is then safe, revocation is idempotent. Leave the switch unset on any deployment that is not behind its own approval step (a shared gateway, for instance) -- the tool is then absent from tools/list. Unblocking an account and resetting a password stay out of scope.
The four Azure Resource Manager tools live in an Entra-named server on purpose: they use the same app registration and the same azure-identity credential object (a second token scope, https://management.azure.com/.default), run in the same deployment and are covered by the same health_check. A separate server for these tools would double the operational surface. They are governance reads, not resource management; a subscription the credential has no Reader role on simply does not appear in list_subscriptions.
Two auth modes, selected by which environment variables are set:
| Mode | When | Env vars |
|---|---|---|
| app-only | All three set | ENTRAADM_TENANT_ID, ENTRAADM_CLIENT_ID, ENTRAADM_CLIENT_SECRET |
| azure-cli | None set | (uses the current az login session) |
Setting one or two of the three app-only variables is a configuration error and the server refuses to start, rather than silently falling back to a different auth mode than intended.
| Tool(s) | Permission | Notes |
|---|---|---|
get_user (base fields) | User.Read.All | |
signin_logs, signin_failure_stats, signin_success_stats, compromise_suspects, signin_by_ip, directory_audits, get_user's sign_in_activity field | AuditLog.Read.All (app-only) or the Reports Reader directory role (delegated) | |
get_user_auth_methods | UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All | App-only only; not available under delegated (az login) auth in a typical tenant role assignment |
m365_service_health, daily_brief's service_health section | ServiceHealth.Read.All | Under delegated auth the signed-in user also needs an Entra role that may read service health (for example Service Support Administrator or Global Reader) |
audit_log_search_start, audit_log_search_result | AuditLogsQuery.Read.All, or the service-scoped AuditLogsQuery-OneDrive.Read.All / AuditLogsQuery-SharePoint.Read.All / AuditLogsQuery-Exchange.Read.All / AuditLogsQuery-Entra.Read.All (application permissions) | Optional. With only a service-scoped permission, pass the matching service. Each search counts against the tenant's audit search limits (searches per day, searches running at once); a 429 comes back as rate_limited: true and is not retried |
compromise_suspects' microsoft_risky_users, the identity_protection probe (health_check, daily_brief) | IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All | Optional. Identity Protection needs Entra ID P2: without it Graph answers 403 "not licensed" and the probe reports not_licensed; nothing else changes |
revoke_sign_in_sessions (opt-in) | User.RevokeSessions.All (app-only) or the User Administrator / Helpdesk Administrator directory role (delegated; Privileged Authentication Administrator for an administrator account) | Only when ENTRAADM_ENABLE_REVOKE_SESSIONS=1. A write permission: grant it only to a deployment that needs the tool. The account lookup before it needs User.Read.All. Without the permission the tool answers missing_permission for the auth mode in use and nothing changes |
| Tool(s) | Role | Notes |
|---|---|---|
list_subscriptions | none | Lists whatever the credential can see; an empty list means no role has been granted anywhere yet |
vm_backup_status, vm_backup_policies, vm_activity | Reader on each subscription | Reader is */read and covers every endpoint used. Backup Reader alone is not enough (it has no Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/read). Granted to the service principal (app-only) or to the signed-in user (azure-cli) |
Azure RBAC is optional: health_check reports ARM reachability and the number of visible subscriptions as an informational arm probe that never changes status, so a deployment used only for Entra triage stays healthy.
A missing permission never crashes a tool. It degrades that tool (or that one field) to {"error": "...", "missing_permission": "..."} with a human-readable explanation of what role or permission is needed, so health_check and every other tool stay usable even before full permissions are granted.
Identity Protection (Entra ID P2). compromise_suspects adds Microsoft's own risk verdicts when the tenant has them: a cheap riskyUsers?$top=1 probe classifies each tenant as licensed, not_licensed (403 "not licensed": no Entra ID P2), no_permission (other 403: no IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All) or error; licensed and not_licensed are cached for an hour (a 200 whose rows say riskLevel: hidden also means no P2). The endpoint itself is probed: /subscribedSkus can be refused and a SKU list would still have to be mapped to P2. health_check reports it per tenant without changing status, and daily_brief's summary per tenant, so the day P2 appears is noticed. Licensed: microsoft_risky_users lists open (atRisk / confirmedCompromised) high-risk users and, separately, medium, marking those also in spray_breaches / foreign_successes. counts are then distinct accounts over every finding, before the lists are cut: high is any account high here or in Microsoft's high list, medium any medium here or in Microsoft's medium list that is not high (counts.microsoft_high / microsoft_medium say how many Microsoft lists). Otherwise the section is {available: false, reason} and nothing else changes -- never read it as "no risky users".
uv tool install entraadm-mcp
pip install entraadm-mcp
Set the three app-only variables for production/unattended use:
export ENTRAADM_TENANT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
export ENTRAADM_CLIENT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 export ENTRAADM_CLIENT_SECRET=your-client-secret
Or leave all three unset and run az login first for local development.
Optional:
# Default page cap for the log-scanning tools (1-50, default 50).
export ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT=50
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