Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
作者による説明(英語の原文)
Deterministic, zero-token security scanner your AI agent calls to find and re-verify issues.
この3つを1つのスコアにまとめることはしません。意見、測定、人気はそれぞれ別のものだからです。
このサーバーのやさしい解説はまだ書いていません。以下はレジストリから読み取った事実です。
使っているAIアプリを選んで、設定をコピーしてください。
必要なもの
どのアプリを使っていますか?
上でアプリを選んでください。選んだアプリを覚えておくので、次からはボタンに「…にインストール」と表示されます。
Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config を開き、claude_desktop_config.json にこれを貼り付けます
{
"mcpServers": {
"scout": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"scout-security",
"scout-mcp"
]
}
}
}ターミナルでこれを実行します
claude mcp add scout -- uvx scout-security scout-mcpプロジェクトの .cursor/mcp.json、または ~/.cursor/mcp.json に貼り付けます
{
"mcpServers": {
"scout": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"scout-security",
"scout-mcp"
]
}
}
}ブラウザがアプリを開いてよいか確認し、そのあとアプリが設定を表示して確認を求めます。キーの値は空欄のままなので、自分で入力してください。
プロジェクトの .vscode/mcp.json に貼り付けます
{
"servers": {
"scout": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"scout-security",
"scout-mcp"
]
}
}
}ブラウザがアプリを開いてよいか確認し、そのあとアプリが設定を表示して確認を求めます。キーの値は空欄のままなので、自分で入力してください。
これはパソコンで動くサーバーですが、ChatGPTがつなげるのはインターネット上のサーバーだけです。ほかのアプリを選んでください。
選んだアプリは、この端末のCookieに保存されます。アカウントは不要です。
この設定は、作者のレジストリ登録情報から作成しています。READMEと違う場合は、READMEに従ってください。
パソコンで動くサーバーです。インストールすると、ツール一覧がAIアプリに表示されます。
誰でも見られる情報をチェックしており、コードは読んでいません。当てはまらない項目は数に入れていません。 · 2026年11月6日にチェック
レジストリ名は、リポジトリを所有するGitHubアカウント Varpost で確認済みです
このリポジトリはまだGitHubから読み取っていません
このリポジトリはまだGitHubから読み取っていません
これはパソコンで動くため、インターネット上のエンドポイントはありません
パソコンで動き、代わりにローカルの設定を使います
パソコンで動くサーバーです。ツール一覧を読み取れるのは、インターネット上のエンドポイントがある場合だけです
レジストリでこのカテゴリにある有効なすべてのサーバーと比較しています。スターは、公開者がリポジトリの所有者である場合だけ数えます。
当てはまる基本チェック1項目のうち1項目に合格しました。コードは読んでいません。キーやトークンを追加する前に、サーバーがどんなアクセスを求めているかを確認し、必要な権限だけを持つキーを使ってください。
レジストリには必須のキーは載っていません。ただし、最初に使うときにサインインを求めるサーバーもあります。
あなたのパソコンで動きます。必要なときにAIアプリが起動し、データは作者のサーバーを通りません(サーバー自体がオンラインサービスを呼び出す場合を除きます)。
GitHubリポジトリの最終更新は–、最新バージョン(0.1.7)がレジストリに届いたのは4 か月前です。
Claude Desktop、Claude Code、Cursor、VS CodeなどのMCP対応アプリで使えます。パソコンにPython (uv)も必要です。
同じカテゴリには:Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, topo^alpin
同じカテゴリで、ほかの作者が作ったサーバー。スターの多い順。
カードの見方:★ GitHubスターi3つの柱:レビュー · チェック · 利用状況i更新=最新バージョンをレジストリに公開した日i
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
Avalanche bulletins and mountain weather forecasts for any place in the Alps.
作者のリポジトリから書かれたとおりにコピーしたものです。PopNx MCPは内容を確認・推奨していません。HTML、画像、スクリプトは取り除いています。リンクはこのサイトの外へ移動します。
AI security team in a CLI. Find vulnerabilities before hackers do — free, local, no signup.
AI coding assistants write insecure code constantly — hardcoded secrets, SQL injection, missing auth. Solo developers ship it because they don't have a security team.
Scout is that team. Static analysis catches the most common mistakes AI assistants make — leaked keys, string-built SQL, shell=True, missing security headers. No API keys, no config, no cost.
Zero-install — try it in one command with uv (no venv, ~1s cold start):
uvx scout-security scan ./my-project
Or install it permanently:
pip install scout-security
Using NCC ScoutSuite too? It also installs a
scoutcommand, and whichever package you installed last owns the name. Scout additionally installs `scoutsec` — same tool, collision-proof name:scoutsec scan ./my-project.
# Scan a project — deterministic static analysis: no API keys, no tokens, no signup
scout scan ./my-project
scout scan ./my-project --format ai-prompt
One scan, four views — choose with --format (-f):
# Layer 1 — human-readable Markdown report (default)
scout scan ./my-app scout scan ./my-app -o security-report.md
scout scan ./my-app --format ai-prompt # writes security-prompts.md scout scan ./my-app --format ai-prompt -o prompts.md
scout scan ./my-app --format json # prints JSON to stdout scout scan ./my-app --format json -o report.json scout scan ./my-app --format json | jq '.findings[]'
scout scan ./my-app --format sarif -o scout.sarif
The same engine powers all of them — Scout finds the problem; your own AI (which already knows your codebase) applies the fix.
scout scan exits 1 when findings at or above --fail-on (default: high) exist, so your pipeline fails on real problems:
scout scan . --fail-on high # default — fail on HIGH or CRITICAL findings
scout scan . --fail-on critical # fail only on CRITICAL scout scan . --fail-on never # report-only mode — always exit 0
The GitHub Action wraps install + scan + SARIF upload, so findings show up as PR annotations via GitHub Code Scanning:
jobs:
scout: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read security-events: write steps:
Prefer plain steps? The same thing by hand (the job still needs security-events: write):
- run: |
pip install scout-security scout scan . --no-ai --format sarif -o scout.sarif --fail-on never
Catch findings before they're ever committed:
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
The hook runs scout scan . --no-ai --fail-on high from your repo root on every commit, so your [tool.scout] config applies. Tune the threshold with args: ["--fail-on", "critical"]. When it fails, Scout writes security-report.md with the details — worth adding to your .gitignore.
Silence a false positive with a trailing comment on the flagged line:
result = eval(trusted_expression) # scout: ignore
result = eval(trusted_expression) # scout: ignore[injection]
Bare scout: ignore silences every finding on that line. The scoped form silences only the named scanner (secrets, injection, headers, deps, custom) or finding id (e.g. injection/eval_usage — the id field in --format json). Findings that can't carry an inline comment — the app-wide CSRF check has no meaningful line, and lockfile findings live in generated JSON — are handled by turning the scanner off via [tool.scout] scanners (below) or accepting them into a baseline (below).
Skip paths with --exclude (repeatable; relative to the scan root, globs allowed):
scout scan . --exclude tests/fixtures --exclude "*.min.js"
Or set project defaults in pyproject.toml — Scout reads [tool.scout] from the scanned project:
[tool.scout]
exclude = ["tests/fixtures", "vendor"] # paths or glob patterns to skip scanners = ["secrets", "injection"] # run a subset: secrets, injection, headers, deps, custom engines = ["semgrep"] # external engines to run and merge (optional) rules = ["scout-rules.yml"] # your own YAML detection rules (optional) fail_on = "medium" # default threshold for --fail-on
CLI flags win: --exclude replaces the config list, --engine replaces engines, and --fail-on overrides fail_on.
Teach Scout project-specific patterns with a YAML file — an id, a regex, a message, a severity:
# scout-rules.yml — referenced from [tool.scout] rules
rules:
Rules are deliberately grep-with-metadata — need metavariables or taint analysis? That's what --engine semgrep is for. A malformed rule warns on stderr and is skipped; it can never break the scan. Custom findings work everywhere native ones do: scout: ignore[custom], baselines, severity gating, JSON/SARIF.
Scout can orchestrate industrial OSS engines and merge their findings into its report, JSON, and SARIF output — same phased remediation plan, wider coverage:
pip install semgrep # or brew install semgrep
scout scan . --engine semgrep # native scanners + semgrep, merged & deduped
codeql)scout scan . --engine codeql # builds a CodeQL DB per language (python/js),
--engine codeql runs the same query suite GitHub code scanning uses, so a Scout report can carry full semantic-analysis findings — expect it to take minutes, not seconds (database extraction is CodeQL's design, not Scout overhead).
Engines are strictly opt-in: the default scan stays zero-dependency and fully deterministic. A requested engine that isn't installed is skipped with a one-line note — never a crash. Engine findings that land on a line a native scanner already flagged are dropped in favor of Scout's own fix guidance.
scout-vscode/ wraps the CLI as a VS Code extension: saving a Python/JS/TS file scans just that file (sub-second) and shows findings as inline squiggles, with taint-traced ones marked *reachable from user input*. A Scout: Scan Workspace command fills the Problems panel for the whole project. It shells out to scoutsec, so your [tool.scout] config applies unchanged.
Don't want to fix years of findings before turning the CI gate on? Accept the current state, then fail only on new findings:
scout scan . --write-baseline # accept current findings → .scout-baseline.json
scout scan . --baseline .scout-baseline.json # report and fail only on NEW findings
Commit .scout-baseline.json. Finding identity is content-based — the rule, the file, and a hash of the flagged line, deliberately no line numbers — so baselined findings stay accepted when unrelated edits shift them up or down a file. Changing the flagged line itself brings the finding back for review.
A secret committed and later removed is still compromised — a scan of today's code can't see it:
scout scan . --git-history # secrets in every added line of every commit, all branches
Findings are anchored to the commit that introduced them (config.py @ 1a2b3c4d5e6f) — rotate anything it reports; deleting the line doesn't un-leak the credential. Needs git on PATH; scans history *instead of* the working tree.
Honest scope: Gitleaks and TruffleHog do deep, fast history auditing as their core job — Scout's pass is the built-in convenience, not a replacement.
| Scanner | Detects | Severity |
|---|---|---|
secrets | AWS/Google keys, GitHub/GitLab tokens, Anthropic & OpenAI keys, Slack/npm/PyPI tokens, Stripe keys, DB URLs, private keys, passwords | CRITICAL |
injection | SQL injection, NoSQL operator injection, command injection, eval()/Function/vm, XSS | CRITICAL |
injection (taint-gated) | Path traversal (file reads/writes, sendFile), SSRF (fetch/requests/axios), insecure deserialization (pickle/yaml.load/unserialize), open redirect (redirect(...)) — fire only when user input reaches the sink | HIGH |
injection (keyword-gated) | Weak randomness for tokens/secrets (Math.random/random.* used for a token/password/OTP) | MEDIUM |
headers | Missing security headers (Express/Flask/Django/FastAPI), wildcard CORS, missing CSRF | LOW–MEDIUM |
deps | Known vulnerabilities in pip + npm dependencies (via OSV.dev) | HIGH |
Deep analysis — injection (SQL/command/XSS) and security headers — targets Python and JS/TS, where the detection patterns are idiom-specific. Both languages get intra-file taint tracking (Python via the stdlib AST, JS/TS via a lexical pass): findings carry a reachable verdict when a sink traces back to user input (request.*, req.body, location.hash, …), ORM/NoSQL sinks fire *only* on taint evidence, and XSS sinks fed by provable in-file constants are dropped instead of reported. The same taint engine powers path traversal (open/fs.readFile/sendFile), SSRF (requests/fetch/axios), insecure deserialization (pickle/yaml.load/unserialize), and open redirect (redirect(...)) detection — all gated on reachability, so open("config.json") and axios.get("https://api.example.com") never fire. Weak randomness for tokens/secrets (Math.random/random.*) is keyword-gated instead — flagged only alongside a token/password/OTP name. Secret detection is language-agnostic: it runs on every common source and config file Scout collects (Go, Java, Ruby, PHP, C/C++, Rust, shell, .env, Dockerfile, docker-compose, Terraform, …), so a hardcoded key is caught whatever language leaked it. Dependency scanning covers requirements.txt and package-lock.json.
Scout's injection scanner is measured against 104 real CVEs from the OpenSSF CVE Benchmark — real vulnerable commits in real JS/TS projects, no synthetic test cases
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