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제작자가 쓴 설명(영어 원문)
Expose trusted GNU Make targets as governed MCP tools without a generic shell.
이 세 가지는 절대 하나의 점수로 합치지 않아요. 의견, 측정, 인기는 서로 다른 것이니까요.
이 서버는 아직 쉬운 말로 된 요약을 쓰지 못했어요. 아래는 레지스트리에서 읽어 온 사실이에요.
쓰고 있는 AI 앱을 고른 다음 설정을 복사하세요.
필요한 것
어떤 앱을 쓰세요?
위에서 앱을 고르세요. 기억해 두었다가 다음부터는 버튼에 “…에 설치”라고 표시해요.
Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config를 열고 claude_desktop_config.json에 이 내용을 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"makefile": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"makefile-mcp",
"serve"
]
}
}
}터미널에서 이 명령어를 실행하세요
claude mcp add makefile -- uvx makefile-mcp serve프로젝트의 .cursor/mcp.json 또는 ~/.cursor/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"makefile": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"makefile-mcp",
"serve"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
프로젝트의 .vscode/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"servers": {
"makefile": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"makefile-mcp",
"serve"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
이 서버는 내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는데, ChatGPT는 인터넷에 있는 서버에만 연결할 수 있어요. 다른 앱을 고르세요.
선택한 앱은 이 기기의 쿠키에만 저장돼요. 계정은 필요 없어요.
이 설정은 제작자의 레지스트리 정보로 만들었어요. README와 다르면 README를 따르세요.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 설치하면 AI 앱에 도구 목록이 나타나요.
누구나 볼 수 있는 정보를 점검했고, 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 해당하지 않는 항목은 개수에서 뺐어요. · 2026년 11월 8일 점검
레지스트리 이름이 GitHub 계정 ai-ronin-systems 기준으로 확인되었고, 이 계정이 저장소를 소유하고 있어요
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는 서버라 인터넷 엔드포인트가 없어요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되며, 대신 로컬 설정을 사용해요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 도구 목록은 인터넷 엔드포인트가 있는 서버에서만 읽을 수 있어요
레지스트리에서 이 카테고리의 활성 서버 전체와 비교했어요. 스타는 게시자가 저장소를 소유한 경우에만 세요.
해당하는 기본 점검 1개 중 1개를 통과했어요. 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 키나 토큰을 넣기 전에 서버가 어떤 권한을 요구하는지 확인하고, 꼭 필요한 권한만 있는 키를 쓰세요.
레지스트리에 필수 키가 나와 있지 않아요. 다만 처음 쓸 때 로그인을 요구하는 서버도 있어요.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. AI 앱이 필요할 때 실행하고, 데이터는 제작자의 서버를 거치지 않아요(서버 자체가 온라인 서비스를 호출하는 경우는 제외).
GitHub 저장소는 마지막으로 – 변경됐고, 최신 버전(0.3.0)은 13일 전 레지스트리에 올라왔어요.
Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code처럼 MCP를 지원하는 앱에서 쓸 수 있어요. 내 컴퓨터에 Python (uv)도 있어야 해요.
같은 카테고리에는: GitHub, Desktop Commander, Cloudflare MCP
같은 카테고리에서 다른 제작자가 만든 서버예요. 스타 순으로 정렬했어요.
카드 보는 법:★ GitHub 스타i세 기둥: 리뷰 · 점검 · 사용 정도i업데이트 = 최신 버전을 레지스트리에 공개한 날i
Connect AI assistants to GitHub - manage repos, issues, PRs, and workflows through natural language.
MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management
Cloudflare MCP servers
제작자의 저장소에서 쓰인 그대로 가져왔어요. PopNx MCP가 검토하거나 보증한 내용이 아니에요. HTML, 이미지, 스크립트는 제거했어요. 링크를 누르면 이 사이트를 벗어나요.
Expose trusted GNU Make targets to AI agents — without exposing a generic shell or replacing Make with another workflow system.
Makefile MCP turns an existing Makefile into typed MCP tools. It is zero-config and run-safe by default, and deny-by-default when governed.
Makefile → Makefile MCP → Codex / Claude / LangChain / Cursor / VS Code / MCP client
Design for a compromised agent: any text it reads can carry a prompt injection. Makefile MCP keeps the worst case short. A hijacked agent can run only the targets you listed, with values you typed, and a human approves the risky ones. Read the [threat model](https://github.com/ai-ronin-systems/makefile-mcp/blob/main/docs/threat-model.md) for the threats, controls, tests that prove them, and limits.
| Protected | Not protected |
|---|---|
| Agents cannot run arbitrary shell commands, only exposed Make targets. | A malicious or buggy Makefile: recipes are trusted code, not sandboxed. |
Without config, agents can only run test, lint, check, and fmt. | A target the operator chose to expose doing something destructive. |
Governed mode runs only allow-listed (context, target) pairs with typed, validated inputs. | Host or container privileges granted outside Makefile MCP. |
dangerous tasks need explicit human approval through the MCP client; no approval, no run. | An MCP client that auto-approves elicitation without a human. |
| Every governed run attempt, refused, approved, or cancelled, can be written to an audit log, with secret inputs masked. | Secrets a recipe prints in ways that differ from the input value. |
| The approval prompt shows the exact arguments; agent-supplied text cannot reshape it. | An agent that can edit unpinned Make code or scripts: editing a recipe is a shell. |
With pin, any edit to the Makefile, its includes, or listed scripts stops the server until a human restarts it. | Prompt injection in output the agent does read; agent_output: tail or none narrows it. |
Audit records are hash-chained; doctor reports edits. A CI test replays a hijacked agent. | A same-user process rewriting the whole log and its chain. |
Details: threat model, SECURITY.md, and security model.
pipx install makefile-mcp # or: uv tool install makefile-mcp
makefile-mcp serve
Given:
test: ## Run tests
pytest -q
lint: ## Run lint ruff check .
Makefile MCP exposes make_test and make_lint as MCP tools. Other targets are listed but not runnable until you govern them.
makefile-mcp list
makefile-mcp doctor makefile-mcp run test makefile-mcp run test --preview # GNU Make --dry-run; not a sandbox
One-shot use: uvx makefile-mcp serve.
Makefile MCP is intentionally narrow: the repository's Makefile remains the executable source of truth, while Makefile MCP supplies a governed agent-facing capability boundary.
| Principle | What it means |
|---|---|
| Make stays authoritative | No duplicate workflow DSL, plugin command language, scheduler, database, or second execution engine. |
| No generic shell capability | Agents invoke discovered or explicitly governed Make targets, not arbitrary host commands. |
| Trusted Makefile, untrusted invocation | Repository automation is trusted; caller-selected tasks and declared values are authorized, validated, and bounded. GNU Make's own variable/function semantics are treated as an interpreter boundary. |
| One execution path | CLI, direct MCP tools, generic MCP tools, preview, contexts, and capabilities share the same catalog, authorization, validation, and executor. |
| Conservative discovery | Makefile MCP statically exposes only Make syntax it can classify confidently; ambiguous constructs are omitted rather than guessed. |
| Bounded Unix runtime | Foreground execution has bounded input/output, timeout/cancellation cleanup, stdin isolation, process-group handling, and physical-context locking. |
See Design rationale for the full capability/property map and the alternatives deliberately left out.
Makefile
| conservative catalog | +-------------+-------------+ | | auto governed no config .makefile-mcp.yaml | | +-------------+-------------+ | Application +---------+---------+ | | MCP direct MCP generic +---------+---------+ | Executor | exact make -f
One catalog. One execution path. Thin CLI and MCP adapters.
See Architecture.
Without .makefile-mcp.yaml, Makefile MCP runs in auto mode: every conservatively discovered root target is listed, but only test, lint, check, and fmt can run, with no caller-controlled Make variables. --legacy-auto-run restores the old run-everything behavior (deprecated).
Add .makefile-mcp.yaml to switch to explicit governance:
schema_version: 1
contexts: backend: directory: backend
tasks: test: contexts: [root, backend] risk: safe
deploy: risk: dangerous variables: ENV: type: enum values: [staging, production] required: true
capabilities: verify: test
audit: path: .makefile-mcp/audit.jsonl
pin: paths: [scripts] # freeze Make code and scripts the agent must not change
Only enabled (context, target) pairs are callable. dangerous tasks additionally need human approval (defaults.require_approval), and audit writes one JSON line per call. See Governed mode, Configuration, and Contexts and capabilities.
Makefile MCP supports three MCP presentations over the same callable catalog. Choose the presentation that best fits your requirements.
makefile-mcp serve --tools direct # default: one typed tool per callable target
makefile-mcp serve --tools generic # list_tasks / describe_task / run_task makefile-mcp serve --tools both # both views, same execution core
See MCP presentations and client setup.
Makefile MCP assumes the repository, Makefiles, included Make code, wrapper scripts, and provisioned tools are trusted operator-controlled code. The security boundary is the invocation: an MCP/CLI caller chooses an exposed task/context and, in governed mode, supplies declared values. Makefile MCP authorizes and validates that request; it does not sandbox hostile Makefiles.
Runtime bounds, cancellation/process-group cleanup, stdin isolation, and locking are primarily execution-correctness properties. They limit failure modes around trusted automation rather than turning Make into a sandbox. The built-in MCP server is stdio-only: no HTTP listener, remote-auth layer, TLS, tenancy, or network-service lifecycle is hidden inside the product.
See [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/ai-ronin-systems/makefile-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md) for the security policy, reporting process, trust boundary, and limitations. Detailed implementation notes are in docs/security.md.
.makefile-mcp.yaml is startup policy; changes require restart and fail closed until then..makefile-mcp.yaml is startup policy. Restart Makefile MCP after adding, removing, or editing it.Makefile or tracked literal includes change.Python 3.11+ · GNU Make · Linux or macOS
.makefile-mcp.yaml fields, defaults, approval, audit log, and precedence.direct, generic, both, schemas, result/error semantics, naming, and lifecycle.앞부분만 보여 드려요. 나머지는 저장소에서 읽어 보세요