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제작자가 쓴 설명(영어 원문)
Catch AI-hallucinated (slopsquatted) npm imports in generated code before npm install.
이 세 가지는 절대 하나의 점수로 합치지 않아요. 의견, 측정, 인기는 서로 다른 것이니까요.
이 서버는 아직 쉬운 말로 된 요약을 쓰지 못했어요. 아래는 레지스트리에서 읽어 온 사실이에요.
쓰고 있는 AI 앱을 고른 다음 설정을 복사하세요.
필요한 것
어떤 앱을 쓰세요?
위에서 앱을 고르세요. 기억해 두었다가 다음부터는 버튼에 “…에 설치”라고 표시해요.
Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config를 열고 claude_desktop_config.json에 이 내용을 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"import-guardian": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"import-guardian-mcp"
]
}
}
}터미널에서 이 명령어를 실행하세요
claude mcp add import-guardian -- npx -y import-guardian-mcp프로젝트의 .cursor/mcp.json 또는 ~/.cursor/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"import-guardian": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"import-guardian-mcp"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
프로젝트의 .vscode/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"servers": {
"import-guardian": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"import-guardian-mcp"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
이 서버는 내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는데, ChatGPT는 인터넷에 있는 서버에만 연결할 수 있어요. 다른 앱을 고르세요.
선택한 앱은 이 기기의 쿠키에만 저장돼요. 계정은 필요 없어요.
이 설정은 제작자의 레지스트리 정보로 만들었어요. README와 다르면 README를 따르세요.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 설치하면 AI 앱에 도구 목록이 나타나요.
누구나 볼 수 있는 정보를 점검했고, 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 해당하지 않는 항목은 개수에서 뺐어요. · 2026년 11월 8일 점검
레지스트리 이름이 GitHub 계정 Baneado98 기준으로 확인되었고, 이 계정이 저장소를 소유하고 있어요
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는 서버라 인터넷 엔드포인트가 없어요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되며, 대신 로컬 설정을 사용해요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 도구 목록은 인터넷 엔드포인트가 있는 서버에서만 읽을 수 있어요
레지스트리에서 이 카테고리의 활성 서버 전체와 비교했어요. 스타는 게시자가 저장소를 소유한 경우에만 세요.
해당하는 기본 점검 1개 중 1개를 통과했어요. 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 키나 토큰을 넣기 전에 서버가 어떤 권한을 요구하는지 확인하고, 꼭 필요한 권한만 있는 키를 쓰세요.
레지스트리에 필수 키가 나와 있지 않아요. 다만 처음 쓸 때 로그인을 요구하는 서버도 있어요.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. AI 앱이 필요할 때 실행하고, 데이터는 제작자의 서버를 거치지 않아요(서버 자체가 온라인 서비스를 호출하는 경우는 제외).
GitHub 저장소는 마지막으로 – 변경됐고, 최신 버전(0.3.0)은 4개월 전 레지스트리에 올라왔어요.
Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code처럼 MCP를 지원하는 앱에서 쓸 수 있어요. 내 컴퓨터에 Node.js도 있어야 해요.
같은 카테고리에는: GitHub, Desktop Commander, Cloudflare MCP
같은 카테고리에서 다른 제작자가 만든 서버예요. 스타 순으로 정렬했어요.
카드 보는 법:★ GitHub 스타i세 기둥: 리뷰 · 점검 · 사용 정도i업데이트 = 최신 버전을 레지스트리에 공개한 날i
Connect AI assistants to GitHub - manage repos, issues, PRs, and workflows through natural language.
MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management
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제작자의 저장소에서 쓰인 그대로 가져왔어요. PopNx MCP가 검토하거나 보증한 내용이 아니에요. HTML, 이미지, 스크립트는 제거했어요. 링크를 누르면 이 사이트를 벗어나요.
Catch AI-hallucinated (slopsquatted) npm imports in generated code — _before_ you run `npm install`.
An LLM just wrote some code. It might import a package that doesn't exist — a name the model confidently hallucinated. Attackers register exactly those names and ship malware. This is slopsquatting, and in 2026 it's one of the fastest-growing supply-chain attacks: code generators have been observed referencing 205,000+ unique non-existent package names, and real hallucinated packages (react-codeshift, a fake huggingface-cli with 30k+ downloads) have already shown up in the wild.
import-guardian reads the generated code, extracts every npm package it imports, and tells you which ones are real — so an agent never installs a name its own model invented.
It's part of the guardian set: npm-guardian audits a package you've _already chosen_ for CVEs and malicious behaviour, license-guardian audits the _licenses_ of your dependencies (GPL/AGPL/BUSL traps) before you ship, and lockfile-guardian audits the resolved package-lock.json for integrity tampering and risky install scripts. import-guardian works one step earlier than all of them, at the moment the code — and its dependency names — are generated.
| 👻 Hallucinated | imports of packages that do not exist on npm — the model invented the name. Returns BLOCK with a "did you mean" to the closest real package. |
| 🪤 Fresh squats | packages that _do_ exist but were published days ago, have no source repo, near-zero downloads, or are a 1–2 edit typo of a popular library. Returns REVIEW. |
| 🧩 Import-aware | resolves import x from "@scope/pkg/sub" → @scope/pkg, lodash/fp → lodash; skips Node built-ins (fs, node:path) and local paths. Plain regex, no AST, zero runtime deps beyond the MCP SDK. |
Verdicts: 🟢 CLEAN · 🟠 REVIEW · 🔴 BLOCK.
{
"mcpServers": { "import-guardian": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "import-guardian-mcp"] } } }
Tools:
package-lock.json), yarn (yarn.lock), pnpm (pnpm-lock.yaml), PyPI (requirements.txt / poetry.lock / Pipfile.lock) or Go (go.mod / go.sum) and it resolves the whole transitive tree and audits every package for dependency confusion, transitive typosquats / homoglyph clones, maintainer-takeover fingerprints, nonexistent pins, and install-script risk. See below.scan_code_imports looks at the handful of imports you can *see*. audit_lockfile looks at the hundreds you can't — the fully resolved dependency graph in your lockfile — and finds the supply-chain attacks an LLM cannot reason about from source alone:
| 🎯 Dependency confusion | a package the lockfile resolves from a private / internal registry whose name is unclaimed on the public index — an attacker can publish that exact name publicly and shadow it. The single highest-impact supply-chain bug, and impossible to detect without the resolved lockfile + a live public-registry cross-check. On PyPI it's sharper still: pip install --extra-index-url merges your private index with public PyPI and installs the highest version from either (the 2021 attack that hit Microsoft / Apple / Tesla). Returns critical. |
| 🪞 Transitive typosquats | homoglyph/Unicode-confusable clones (rеact with a Cyrillic *e*), transpositions (axois→axios), and registry-specific squats (PyPI python3-dateutil vs python-dateutil, normalized per PEP 503) across the entire tree — matched against a large per-ecosystem corpus of high-traffic packages. |
| 🕳️ Maintainer takeover | the fingerprint of a compromised maintainer: a dormant package suddenly republished, a sole-maintainer project, or a rapid republish burst — the pattern behind event-stream, ua-parser-js, node-ipc and PyPI's ctx hijack. |
| 💉 Install-script version-diffing | the sharpest injection signal: a package whose newest release ADDED a postinstall/preinstall/install/prepare hook that the previous release did not have. A previously-clean dependency that suddenly gains code-execution-on-install is exactly how event-stream and ua-parser-js shipped — caught by diffing the two releases' metadata on the live registry. Returns critical, and tells you the last clean version to pin. |
| 🔬 Install-script PAYLOAD analysis | goes past *whether* a hook exists to *what it does*: downloads the package tarball, gunzip+untars it in-memory (no deps), resolves the lifecycle command to its entry file, and statically analyzes the actual code for malware behavior — network egress, credential/env exfil, child-process exec, download-and-run, obfuscation. An obfuscation-resistant AST/token analyzer decodes \x/\u/octal escapes and folds split-string concatenation, so a sink hidden as require("child_pro"+"cess") or global["ev"+"al"](…) is still caught. The payload lives inside a binary artifact the buyer's agent never fetches — that's the access+compute moat. |
| 🐍 PyPI sdist `setup.py` payload analysis | the PyPI analogue of the npm tarball pass, and the sharpest PyPI surface: a source distribution runs setup.py — arbitrary Python — at `pip install` time, before any of your code. We download the sdist (anti-DoS capped), untar it in-memory, and statically analyze setup.py / setup.cfg / pyproject.toml for the stealer/loader pattern — os.environ exfil, os.system/subprocess exec, .pypirc/AWS/SSH credential theft, urllib/requests egress, exec/eval/__import__ obfuscation, download-and-run, and a non-standard build backend. A Python AST de-obfuscator decodes \x/\u/octal escapes and folds split + implicit-adjacent strings, so getattr(__import__("o"+"s"),"sys"+"tem")(…) is still resolved. The ctx / jeIlyfish / colourama attack class — caught from an artifact the buyer's agent never fetches. **BLOCK is gated on the malware *combination* (exfil/download-exec/packed-loader), so a legitimate C/Cython build that merely shells out to a compiler is reported as an informational note, not** a false-positive block. |
| 🦠 Known-malware / known-vuln (live OSV cross-reference) | every resolved package is cross-referenced — at its exact pinned version — against the live [OSV.dev](https://osv.dev) advisory database (which ingests the OpenSSF Malicious Packages feed as MAL-* plus GitHub/PyPI/Go/crates/Maven/Packagist advisories). If the version your lockfile pins is documented malware (e.g. event-stream@3.3.6, ctx@0.1.2), that's a critical / BLOCK — the strongest possible signal. The mapping is version-specific: event-stream@3.3.6 is malware, 3.3.4 is clean, and only a live database query can tell them apart. This is a different *kind* of moat from the static passes above — the buyer's model doesn't hold the advisory corpus and can't resolve version↔advisory. Queries are batched, cached (TTL), concurrency-capped, and degrade clean if OSV is unreachable (it never turns a clean package into a false positive). |
| 🏗️ Local build-backend follow-hop (PyPI) | when pyproject.toml declares a **non-standard build backend that ships *inside* the sdist (`backend-path = ["."]`), the package runs its own code as the PEP 517 backend at every build/install. We resolve that module to its file in the sdist and analyze its real source** (and follow setup.py's local imports one hop), instead of merely flagging the backend name — closing the gap where a payload hides one indirection away from setup.py. |
| 🔀 Go `replace` hijack | a replace … => host/path in go.mod pointing at an external host, live-verified against the Go module proxy. If the replacement doesn't resolve (a private / attacker host), the code your build actually compiles isn't the module you audited or anything go.sum can vouch for. |
| 💣 Install-script & provenance risk | packages in the resolved tree that run install scripts, brand-new pins, missing repos, and near-zero real downloads (verified against npm / pypistats / crates.io). |
Seven ecosystems. The same resolved-graph engine runs over npm / yarn / pnpm, PyPI (requirements.txt, poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock), Go modules (go.mod, go.sum), Rust / Cargo (Cargo.lock, Cargo.toml), Java (Maven pom.xml, Gradle build.gradle / .kts / gradle.lockfile) and PHP / Composer (composer.json, composer.lock) — each cross-checked against its own public index (npm registry, PyPI, the Go module proxy, crates.io, Maven Central, Packagist). On crates.io the matcher knows the -/_ equivalence (rustdecimal vs rust_decimal); on Maven an internal groupId:artifactId unclaimed on Central is the dependency-confusion target; on Composer an internal vendor/package unregistered on Packagist while a private repo is merged with the public index is the confusion target, and a Packagist-abandoned package is flagged as a takeover risk. Large lockfiles are bounded: direct + private-source packages are always live-checked first, then transitive up to a cap, so one call never fans out to tens of thousands of requests.
POST /pro/audit { "lockfile": "<contents of package-lock.json>", "filename": "package-lock.json" }
Pay per call via x402 (USDC on Base) or a prepaid Stripe key. The free POST /audit returns the verdict and issue counts by severity, but withholds which packages are affected and why — that's the paid report. This deep engine runs server-side only and is never shipped in the npm package.
scan_code_imports({ code: 'import shift from "react-codeshift";\nimport React from "react";' })
🟠 REVIEW — 1 referenced package(s) look risky. 🟠 react-codeshift (risk 57/100) • No source repository linked. • Only 1 published version. • Only 3 downloads in the last week despite being 158 days old. 🟢 react (ok) — established package.
POST /scan { "code": "import x from 'reqeusts'\nimport y from 'lodash'" }
GET /verify?name=express
Hosted at https://import-guardian.vercel.app · try /verify?name=express vs /verify?name=reqeusts.
The /pro/* routes are gated by x402. Your agent pays $0.02 USDC per call automatically — no sign-up, no API key. Payment settles on-chain (USDC on Base). The server holds no private key; it only declares a public receiving address.
POST /pro/scan { "code": "…" } # 402 → pay → result, no rate limit
registry.npmjs.org) and the download-stats API — these are facts, not guesses, which is the moat: an agent can't reliably know on its own whether a name it generated is real and trusted.앞부분만 보여 드려요. 나머지는 저장소에서 읽어 보세요