Enpass MCP

enpass-mcp

A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that gives an AI assistant controlled, local access to your Enpass password vaults: unlock a vault, list vaults, and list and read entries. Creating and deleting entries is possible too, but switched off until you enable it.

Runs locally over stdio. Your Enpass vault never leaves your machine, and your master password never passes through the model: it is stored in your operating system's keychain and read directly by the server.

Why this is safe

• Master passwords live in the OS keychain (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service), not in config files, not in environment variables, and never as a tool argument. The unlock_vault tool deliberately takes no password parameter, so the password can never end up in the model's context or in logs.
• The vault stays local. The server reads the encrypted vault.enpassdb file directly with SQLCipher. Nothing is uploaded anywhere.
• Reads are explicit. Listing entries never returns passwords. Secrets are only returned by get_item / get_password, when you explicitly ask for them.
• Read-only unless you say otherwise. Out of the box the server cannot change anything: the writing tools are not even advertised. Set ENPASS_MCP_ALLOW_WRITES=1 to enable them (see Writing).

Entry passwords are, by design, returned to the assistant when you ask for them, so only connect this to an assistant and vaults you trust.

Requirements

• Node.js 18 or newer
• An Enpass 6 / 7 / 8 vault (vault.enpassdb, SQLCipher format)
• On Linux: a Secret Service provider (GNOME Keyring or KWallet) for password storage

Native dependencies (better-sqlite3-multiple-ciphers, @napi-rs/keyring) ship prebuilt binaries for common platforms, so no compiler is required in the normal case.

Install

git clone https://github.com/bitterdev/enpass-mcp.git

cd enpass-mcp npm install npm link # optional: makes the enpass-mcp command available globally

Register your vaults (do this once, in a terminal)

This is the secure step that keeps the master password away from the model. You run it yourself; the password is typed into a hidden prompt and stored in the OS keychain.

# Find your vault files automatically

enpass-mcp discover

Register a vault (you will be prompted for the master password)

enpass-mcp add-vault personal --path "/Users/you/Documents/Enpass/Vaults/primary/vault.enpassdb" enpass-mcp add-vault work --path "/path/to/work/vault.enpassdb"

With a keyfile

enpass-mcp add-vault personal --path "/path/vault.enpassdb" --keyfile "/path/vault.keyfile"

Manage

enpass-mcp list-vaults enpass-mcp test-unlock personal enpass-mcp remove-vault work

add-vault verifies the password can actually unlock the vault before saving it.

The vault file is usually found at:

If you sync via Dropbox / OneDrive / WebDAV, point --path at the synced copy.

Connect it to your assistant

The server speaks MCP over stdio. Point your MCP client at enpass-mcp serve.

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json):

{

"mcpServers": { "enpass": { "command": "enpass-mcp", "args": ["serve"] } } }

If you did not run npm link, use the absolute path instead:

{

"mcpServers": { "enpass": { "command": "node", "args": ["/absolute/path/to/enpass-mcp/src/cli.js", "serve"] } } }

Claude Code:

claude mcp add enpass -- enpass-mcp serve

Tools

With ENPASS_MCP_ALLOW_WRITES=1 three more tools appear (see Writing):

list_items / get_item work for every Enpass entry type (logins, credit cards, secure notes, identities, etc.), not just logins, and return all fields.

A typical assistant flow: list_vaults → unlock_vault → list_items → get_password.

How it works

Enpass stores each vault as a standard SQLCipher database (vault.enpassdb). The raw encryption key is derived from your master password (optionally combined with a keyfile) and the 16-byte salt at the start of the file:

• PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 100000 iterations (older vaults) or 320000 (newer vaults), the first 32 bytes used as the raw SQLCipher key
• opened with cipher_compatibility 4 (Enpass 6.8+) or 3 (older vaults)

The server tries these combinations automatically, so it works across Enpass vault versions. The derived key is kept in memory only, for the lifetime of the server process, and is never written to disk or returned to the model.

References: Enpass Security Whitepaper, hazcod/enpass-cli.

Per-item field encryption

Enpass encrypts every value flagged as "sensitive" a second time, underneath SQLCipher, with a key that belongs to the entry rather than the vault. Fields carrying that layer have itemfield.algo_version = 1:

Binding the AAD to the entry uuid is what makes a value unusable if it is copied into another entry. Enpass did not re-encrypt existing entries when it introduced this layer, so one vault mixes ciphertext and plaintext under the same algo_version; a value is treated as encrypted only when it has the shape of a payload (pure hex, whole bytes, longer than the tag on its own).

A value that looks encrypted but fails authentication is returned as null with decryptionFailed: true, never as the raw column content: stored ciphertext is a plausible-looking string, and handing that back would silently pass off a wrong secret as a real one.

Two-factor codes (TOTP)

Entries with a one-time-password secret (stored by Enpass as an otpauth:// URI) can produce a live 2FA code: get_otp returns the current 6-digit code and the seconds until it rotates, and get_password includes the current code alongside the password. This lets an assistant fill both the password and the 2FA prompt.

Attachments

Enpass keeps file attachments encrypted. Small files (up to 1 KB) sit inline in the vault; larger files live in separate .enpassattach SQLCipher files next to the vault, each encrypted with its own key stored in the vault. export_attachment handles both: it decrypts the file and, by default, writes it to disk and returns the path, so it works for files of any size without pushing binary data through the model.

Two details of that format are easy to miss, and both were wrong here until they were measured against real vaults:

• attachment.password is not a key blob. It holds the finished SQLCipher raw-key expression as text, x'<64 hex key chars><32 hex salt chars>', and has to be passed through verbatim. Hex-encoding it produces a key SQLCipher rejects, and every external attachment then fails with "file is not a database".
• The stored payload is frequently a base64 data URI (data:application/pdf;base64,...) rather than the file itself, so it has to be decoded. Writing those bytes straight to disk yields a text file with a .pdf name. attachment.size counts the stored bytes, which is why it is larger than the exported file for anything wrapped this way.

If you hit a vault whose attachments still do not decrypt, please open an issue with the (non-secret) schema of your attachment table.

Attachments also do not travel inside the folder-sync container: Enpass drops the .enpassattach files into the sync folder next to it. sync_pull fetches the ones this machine is missing, and publishing a write copies local ones the sync folder lacks. Existing files are never overwritten or removed in either direction.

Writing (opt-in)

Writing is switched off by default. A password vault is the last place where a tool should be able to change data just because a model decided to, so the server starts read-only and does not even list create_item, delete_item, add_attachment and sync_pull until you turn them on:

ENPASS_MCP_ALLOW_WRITES=1

Set it in the server's environment (in your MCP client config, or in the .env next to vaults.json). Nothing else changes: reading works exactly the same either way.

Enpass must be closed while writing. The app keeps the database in memory and would write its own cached copy back over any change made underneath it. Every writing tool refuses to run while Enpass is open.

Earlier versions of this README claimed writing was impossible because recent vaults (schema version 6) crash Enpass when entries are inserted directly. The crash was real, the diagnosis was wrong. Three concrete rules make it work, all of them derived from what Enpass itself writes:

1. Enpass never stores `NULL`. The crash is EXC_BAD_ACCESS in strlen on a null pointer: a column omitted from the INSERT defaults to NULL, and the app calls strlen on it. Every column is written explicitly, empty strings instead of NULL.
2. A template has a fixed field set. login.default always carries the same nine fields, in the same order, with the same field uids, even when most are empty. Writing only the fields you happen to have a value for produces an entry the app cannot render.
3. The per-item key is reproducible. item.key is a 32-byte AES-256 key plus a 12-byte GCM nonce, stored as hex(ciphertext || tag) with the item UUID as additional authenticated data. Nothing in it is tied to Enpass internals, so a fresh random key per item is fine.

Verified end to end against a real vault: written, read back, decrypted to the original, deleted, synced in both directions, and Enpass opens the vault without crashing.

Attaching files

add_attachment takes a path, never base64 in the argument list, and stores the bytes raw in the attachment's own encrypted database. Two rules come out of the same format details as readin