Conarium

Conarium The Third Eye for Your Company's Data. Part of VERAX , by VERAX Teknoloji. Start with the VERAX body: verax-ai/verax . Sister projects: Tugra · Cedulon . Listed on: npm · Glama · MCP Registry · MCP Market · LobeHub · Zenodo

A self-hosted, governed gateway that lets AI coding assistants (Cursor, Copilot, Claude) touch your real data under a policy you write—protected values masked before they leave. When a receipt sink is configured it writes a signed, independently verifiable receipt of every access it mediates; conarium-init sets that sink, so the default layout does.

The site lives at conarium.dev; this repository is the product.

Check it before you read the rest

Nothing below has to be taken on trust. There is a live receipt chain; verify it against its public key on your own machine, with no account and no data of yours:

npm i @conarium-ai/core

curl -fsS https://conarium.dev/proof/chain.jsonl -o chain.jsonl curl -fsS https://conarium.dev/proof/key.pem -o key.pem curl -fsS https://conarium.dev/proof/key.pem.keyid -o key.pem.keyid npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem

note: tail truncation is not visible — this run did not see receipts deleted from the end of the file. Pin with --expect-count, --expect-last-hash, or --anchor-check. ok: 3 receipt(s) verified (3 with undeclared model, 3 with undeclared client)

Exit code 0. The three receipts are one ordinary read, one where five email addresses and a card number were masked before the model saw them, and one refusal. Change any field and the recomputed hash stops matching the stored one — exit 10. Change the signature instead — exit 13.

The verifier is a single file that imports nothing from the package it is checking, so a compromised Conarium cannot talk it into a passing result. Note that it volunteers what it did *not* check, in the first line of its own output, before the good news.

Limitations

What this repository has not done is in LIMITATIONS.md (Türkçe). The dated comparison page is conarium.dev/compare.html — that is the only copy; this repo does not keep a second one.

Standards

draft-dogru-scitt-disclosure-evidence is an individual submission. Not adopted by an IETF working group, and it carries no formal standing — an Internet-Draft is a dated public record, not a standard. It is published so the receipt format can be implemented without us. Source files live in standards/.

👁️ The Problem

Point Cursor or Copilot at a production database and it drinks the raw stream—SSNs, credit cards, salaries, and live keys. One rogue prompt can expose your most sensitive tables. Security teams simply can't allow that.

🛡️ The Solution: Conarium

Conarium acts as a high-performance MCP (Model Context Protocol) Proxy. It sits directly between the AI Assistant and your databases, evaluating policies in milliseconds to enforce row limits and mask PII (Personally Identifiable Information) on the wire.

The AI gets the context it needs to write code; the values your policy protects are masked before they reach it. Masking hides a value — it does not make it unlearnable, and where a request language allows predicates over a protected column, an allowed query can still answer questions about one. protectedColumns is the narrower answer to that, and the limit is stated in LIMITATIONS.md rather than left for you to discover.

Key Features

• Inline PII Masking: Emails, IDs, cards, and secrets are redacted in the response stream ([MASKED_PII] / [MASKED_SECRET]) before the model sees a single character.
• Allow / Deny Lists: Whitelist what AI can access. Your secrets and financials tables stay invisible.
• Row Caps: Hard per-query limits. Prevent the silent exfiltration of millions of rows.
• Tamper-Evident Audit Ledger: Every access *through Conarium* is logged (who, what, when, rows, decision). Hash-chained, which makes alteration and mid-chain removal detectable — not impossible: a file on disk can still be deleted or truncated, and catching truncation needs a pin from outside the file (see Coverage & Reconciliation below). PII-safe: no raw PII is written to the logs.
• Verifiable Receipts: Ed25519-signed, independently verifiable receipts — see below.
• Per-person masking profiles: what to mask for an AI agent is not what to mask for the data controller. A named profile relaxes masking for one identified person, and the receipt records which profile applied — see below.
• Coverage & Reconciliation: a signed coverage declaration over the receipt chain (conarium-coverage), plus two-sided reconciliation against the database's own query counters (conarium-reconcile) — DB-recorded activity that no receipt covers is surfaced instead of staying invisible.
• 100% Self-Hosted: Runs entirely on your infrastructure. Nothing we ship transmits your data anywhere: raw protected values stay inside your perimeter, and what reaches your AI client is the policy-approved disclosure — whose exact bytes the receipt records (disclosure.hash). Saying your data never leaves at all would be the wrong claim: releasing a governed disclosure to an assistant is the job. The gateway makes exactly one outbound request that is not yours: at startup it asks the public npm registry whether a newer version exists, and prints one line to stderr if so. It sends nothing about you — no identifier, no config, no counts — and a remote gateway nobody looks at for weeks is the reason it exists at all. Disable it with CONARIUM_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1, or point it at your internal mirror with CONARIUM_NPM_REGISTRY. It has a 2-second timeout and never blocks or fails startup. We list it here because a governance product that makes an undisclosed outbound connection has already lost the argument.
• MCP-Native: Works out of the box with Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Claude Code, and Codex.

Verifiable Receipts

Conarium can emit portable receipts (Art. 12 / 19 shaped) that a third party verifies offline with a single file — no Conarium install required.

Official claim (do not widen): A Conarium Receipt proves that the records still in the file have not been altered, reordered, or backdated after they were created, and that none were removed from the middle of the chain (prevHash / seq). It does not prove they were correct at the moment of creation. It also cannot, by itself, prove that records were not dropped from the end: a shorter leftover chain is still internally consistent. Catching tail truncation needs a pin from outside the file — --expect-count, --expect-last-hash, an OpenTimestamps anchor, or conarium-reconcile against the database's own counters.

*(TR)* Conarium Makbuzu, dosyada hâlâ duran kayıtların oluşturulduktan sonra değiştirilmediğini, ortadan silinmediğini, yeniden sıralanmadığını ve geriye dönük tarihlenmediğini kanıtlar. Oluşturma anında doğru olduğunu kanıtlamaz. Sondan kesmeyi tek başına göremez: kalan zincir tutarlıdır, yalnızca kısadır. *(/TR)*

# Generate an Ed25519 keypair (private PEM + .pub.pem + .keyid sidecars).

The .keyid sidecars are not optional: without them the verifier answers 13

for every receipt, which reads like tampering and is not.

npx conarium-init

export CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY=./audit-ed25519.pem

init writes keys and config, not receipts: your own audit file does not exist

until the gateway has served a query. The three commands below therefore run

against the demo chain downloaded above, so they work as written — swap in

your own sink (conarium.config.json → audit.sink) once it has records.

Verify a receipt chain (exit 0 = the records *in the file* are intact)

npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem

Pin length / last hash if you need to catch records dropped from the end

npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem --expect-count 3

Check the OpenTimestamps sidecar. The demo chain ships without one, so this

answers 14, deliberately not 0: an absent anchor is not a verified anchor.

A sidecar that exists but is not yet confirmed → exit 0 with a warning.

npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem --anchor-check

A second verifier, Go and the standard library only, is in verifiers/go. go build -o conarium-verify . then the same arguments as conarium-verify; test-vectors/ is the contract.

Anchoring is a separate step. Stamp a document with npx conarium-stamp , or submit a chain-head hash with npx conarium-anchor-service. CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps selects the in-tree calendar client those tools use; it does not stamp receipts as they are written. Upgrade pending proofs later with npx conarium-anchor-upgrade ./audit.jsonl.anchors.jsonl. The client is in-tree (Node crypto + calendar HTTPS). It does not install javascript-opentimestamps. See LIMITATIONS.md.

Per-person masking profiles

Masking that is correct for an AI agent is wrong for the person who owns the data. The owner asking *"which customer owes the most"* needs the name; the assistant summarising revenue does not. Answering that with a global on/off switch would disable the product's only real guarantee, so masking resolves per person:

{

"policy": { "allowTables": ["zion.customers", "zion.orders"], "maskColumns": ["*.customer_name", "*.email", "*.phone"], // default: everyone "maxRows": 100,

"profiles": { // The controller sees customer names; e