Sanctuary

Name: Sanctuary
Author: eriknewton

제작자: eriknewton버전 1.8.4i★ –i내 컴퓨터에서 실행

레지스트리 이름ai.sanctuaryprotocol/sanctuary

설치

개요

제작자가 쓴 설명(영어 원문)

Open-source MCP server: encrypted local keys and state, operator approval gates, a hash-chained log.

PopNx MCP의 세 기둥

이 세 가지는 절대 하나의 점수로 합치지 않아요. 의견, 측정, 인기는 서로 다른 것이니까요.

사용자 의견i아직 리뷰가 없어요리뷰는 다음 단계에서 계정 기능과 함께 열려요
우리의 기본 점검i1개 중 0개 통과공개된 정보로 점검했으며, 코드는 아직 스캔하지 않았어요
사용 정도i아직 측정 안 함★ –

할 수 있는 일

이 서버는 아직 쉬운 말로 된 요약을 쓰지 못했어요. 아래는 레지스트리에서 읽어 온 사실이에요.

연결 방식: 내 컴퓨터에서 실행
전송 방식: stdio
카테고리: 기타

설치

쓰고 있는 AI 앱을 고른 다음 설정을 복사하세요.

설치하기 전에

기본 점검: 1개 중 0개 통과
내 컴퓨터에서 내 사용자 계정의 권한(파일, 네트워크, 앱)으로 실행돼요.
레지스트리에 입력해야 할 키가 나와 있지 않아요.

필요한 것

npmNode.js 설치(npx 명령어용)

어떤 앱을 쓰세요?

ClaudeClaude CodeCursorVS CodeChatGPT

위에서 앱을 고르세요. 기억해 두었다가 다음부터는 버튼에 “…에 설치”라고 표시해요.

Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config를 열고 claude_desktop_config.json에 이 내용을 붙여 넣으세요

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "sanctuary": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@sanctuary-framework/mcp-server"
      ]
    }
  }
}

터미널에서 이 명령어를 실행하세요

claude mcp add sanctuary -- npx -y @sanctuary-framework/mcp-server

Cursor에서 열기

또는 설정을 직접 복사하기

프로젝트의 .cursor/mcp.json 또는 ~/.cursor/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "sanctuary": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@sanctuary-framework/mcp-server"
      ]
    }
  }
}

브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.

VS Code에서 열기

또는 설정을 직접 복사하기

프로젝트의 .vscode/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요

{
  "servers": {
    "sanctuary": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@sanctuary-framework/mcp-server"
      ]
    }
  }
}

브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.

이 서버는 내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는데, ChatGPT는 인터넷에 있는 서버에만 연결할 수 있어요. 다른 앱을 고르세요.

선택한 앱은 이 기기의 쿠키에만 저장돼요. 계정은 필요 없어요.

이 설정은 제작자의 레지스트리 정보로 만들었어요. README와 다르면 README를 따르세요.

할 수 있는 일

내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 설치하면 AI 앱에 도구 목록이 나타나요.

기본 점검i

누구나 볼 수 있는 정보를 점검했고, 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 해당하지 않는 항목은 개수에서 뺐어요. · 2026년 11월 6일 점검

! 주의
제작자와 저장소 일치
게시자(sanctuaryprotocol.ai)가 저장소 소유자(eriknewton)가 아니에요. 다른 사람이 등록했을 수 있어요
… 아직 점검 안 함
계속 관리되고 있음
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
… 아직 점검 안 함
라이선스 있음
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
– 해당 없음
엔드포인트 응답
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는 서버라 인터넷 엔드포인트가 없어요
– 해당 없음
OAuth로 로그인
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되며, 대신 로컬 설정을 사용해요
… 아직 점검 안 함
도구 설명에 숨겨진 지시 없음
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 도구 목록은 인터넷 엔드포인트가 있는 서버에서만 읽을 수 있어요

기타 카테고리의 다른 서버와 비교i

이 카테고리의 다른 서버 32464개 중 0%보다 스타가 많아요
이 카테고리의 다른 서버 32464개 중 61%보다 최근에 레지스트리에 공개됐어요
기본 점검 결과가 이 카테고리의 다른 서버 32464개 중 33%와 같거나 더 좋아요

레지스트리에서 이 카테고리의 활성 서버 전체와 비교했어요. 스타는 게시자가 저장소를 소유한 경우에만 세요.

자주 묻는 질문

Sanctuary, 안전한가요?

해당하는 기본 점검 1개 중 0개를 통과했어요. 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 키나 토큰을 넣기 전에 서버가 어떤 권한을 요구하는지 확인하고, 꼭 필요한 권한만 있는 키를 쓰세요.

어떤 키나 코드가 필요한가요?

레지스트리에 필수 키가 나와 있지 않아요. 다만 처음 쓸 때 로그인을 요구하는 서버도 있어요.

내 컴퓨터에서 실행되나요, 클라우드에서 실행되나요?

내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. AI 앱이 필요할 때 실행하고, 데이터는 제작자의 서버를 거치지 않아요(서버 자체가 온라인 서비스를 호출하는 경우는 제외).

아직 관리되고 있나요?

GitHub 저장소는 마지막으로 – 변경됐고, 최신 버전(1.8.4)은 24일 전 레지스트리에 올라왔어요.

어떤 앱에서 쓸 수 있나요?

Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code처럼 MCP를 지원하는 앱에서 쓸 수 있어요. 내 컴퓨터에 Node.js도 있어야 해요.

대신 쓸 수 있는 건 뭐가 있나요?

같은 카테고리에는: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, yontu

대안

같은 카테고리에서 다른 제작자가 만든 서버예요. 스타 순으로 정렬했어요.

카드 보는 법:★ GitHub 스타i세 기둥: 리뷰 · 점검 · 사용 정도i업데이트 = 최신 버전을 레지스트리에 공개한 날i

Spec Driven Development

제작자: formulahendry

MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.

내 컴퓨터에서 실행★ 440MIT14개월 전 업데이트

설치

Remote Desktop Commander

제작자: desktop-commander

Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.

클라우드에서 실행★ 211어제 업데이트

설치

yontu

제작자: senrecep

Türkçe yazı denetimi: TDK kuralları, yapay zekâ izleri, metin türüne göre üslup.

내 컴퓨터에서 실행오늘 업데이트

설치

제작자의 README

README 열기

제작자의 저장소에서 쓰인 그대로 가져왔어요. PopNx MCP가 검토하거나 보증한 내용이 아니에요. HTML, 이미지, 스크립트는 제거했어요. 링크를 누르면 이 사이트를 벗어나요.

Sanctuary

Your agent will know you better than you know yourself. Make sure that data stays between you.

An AI agent running on your machine can do anything your account can do. It holds your credentials, reads your files, and talks to the whole internet, and a single poisoned web page can turn that into exfiltration. Every sandbox on offer today is one the agent, or its vendor, chooses to run inside. That is not a wall. That is a request.

Sanctuary is the wall under the agent, imposed by the operating system under a policy you sign, and it does not depend on the agent's cooperation. The keys never leave hardware you control. What the agent did is written to a hash-chained record you can read. No vendor, including us, sits in the path or can decrypt your state. It works with the harness you already run: Claude Code, Cursor, Hermes, OpenClaw, Cline, or Mastra (fixture-tested only; no live Mastra-agent drill is recorded), on your own machine today, any number of wrapped harnesses behind one persistent dashboard, with wrapping tested on representative harness paths and not proven for every harness version (Assurance Matrix, Agent wrapping, partial); another MCP-compatible harness can point its MCP config at Sanctuary, without a tested wrapping path; the fleet console and operator-cloud deployment are roadmapped (see Deployment modes).

npx -y @sanctuary-framework/mcp-server protect --claude-code

That one command puts the keys, audit trail, policy gates, and dashboard around the agent you already use. The operating-system wall is a separate privileged arming step on macOS through the signed app and extension path; see the Castle Wall macOS install and arm guide.

Summary for agents

Quote the block below to your operator. It was written against v1.8.4, the npm latest release; main can be ahead of it, and every sentence traces to a line of this README or a row of the Assurance Matrix.

What Sanctuary is: the wall under the agent, imposed by the operating system under a policy you sign, and it does not depend on the agent's cooperation. The keys never leave hardware you control. What the agent did is written to a hash-chained record you can read.

What it is not: no Assurance Matrix row claims a filesystem or process sandbox for the agent; that is what your harness's own sandbox provides. The record is not an audited per-rule, per-flow trail. Windows enforcement is roadmapped; nothing enforces on Windows today. Linux enforcement is proven on Ubuntu 24.04 (x86-64) only; every other distribution or architecture remains unproven. Linux enforcement ships as the separate Castle Wall Linux 0.1.0-1 package (a GitHub pre-release), not in the npm package. Platforms and runtime: Node.js >= 22.0.0 and npm >= 10.0.0. macOS: proven. Linux: proven on Ubuntu 24.04 (x86-64) only, through the separate Castle Wall Linux 0.1.0-1 package (a GitHub pre-release, not part of the npm package). Windows: roadmapped. Install: npx -y @sanctuary-framework/mcp-server protect --claude-code --no-open --no-dashboard Verify: npx -y @sanctuary-framework/mcp-server doctor --json Uninstall: npx -y @sanctuary-framework/mcp-server uninstall Evidence: every capability claim traces to a row in ASSURANCE_MATRIX.md, and a row reads proven only when a captured drill on the platform that matters says so. Drill records are under docs/audit/.

What is proven, and what is not

Every capability claim in this repository traces to a row in the Assurance Matrix, and a row reads proven only when a captured drill on the platform that matters says so. A green test suite is not a claim. Read the matrix before you believe anything below.

What you get	Status today
The wall. Outbound traffic from a wrapped agent is allowed or denied below the agent, per operator policy, per agent account	macOS: proven. A signed operator policy with a clean per-uid allow/deny demonstration that survives attended reboot cycles. Not an audited per-rule, per-flow trail. Linux: proven on Ubuntu 24.04 (x86-64) only. Linux enforcement ships as the separate Castle Wall Linux 0.1.0-1 package (a GitHub pre-release), not in the npm package. On Ubuntu 24.04 (x86-64), a fresh install of that package enforces a signed operator policy per user account: blocked destinations stay blocked and allowed ones connect, through five reboots, on three fresh servers, with the evidence checked by two independent reviewers. Fault-injection witnesses, a real-agent harness, and every other distribution or architecture remain unproven. Windows: roadmapped.
Custody. Keys and state under your passphrase, on your hardware	Proven. Ed25519 identity, Argon2id unlock, per-purpose derived subkeys, encrypted state at rest. The passphrase lives in the macOS Keychain or Linux Secret Service and generation fails closed without it.
The gate. Policy you set, frozen at startup, the agent cannot read or infer; three approval tiers with a human on the irreversible ones	Proven. Cooperative gates on every MCP call Sanctuary executes or forwards. The wall is what makes the gate more than a request.
The record. Append-only, hash-chained audit of what the agent did	Partial. The chain is live; production call sites sign checkpoints when the fortress holds an identity. Fortresses with no identity and the root daemon split audit store write honest unsigned checkpoints. The row stays partial pending the IC-05 external-verifier drill and the remaining local tamper-evidence follow-up.
Exit. Keys, state, memory and reputation leave with you	Partial. Export and import ship; three exit-bundle gaps are open (IC-07, IC-08, IC-09).

Why this shape

Plenty of tools can sandbox an agent when the agent, or its harness, chooses to run inside one. Sanctuary is built for the harder promise: the wall is imposed by the operator, and does not depend on the agent's cooperation. The problem underneath is ambient authority, the fact that code can act with every permission its process has. Language-level answers (capabilities, information-flow typing, functional runtimes) are real and we welcome them, and every one of them still needs something outside the interpreter that holds the credentials, checks the policy and decides what actually leaves the machine. Sanctuary is that something, for whatever runtime you choose. It composes with Concordia (agent negotiation) and Verascore (portable reputation), each in its own repo and neither required.

Why this exists: The Base Layer.

Sanctuary and your harness's sandbox

Your harness already has a sandbox, and the two are built for different questions. The harness sandbox bounds what the agent's shell commands can touch; Sanctuary bounds where the agent account's traffic can go and holds the keys and the record, whether or not the agent cooperates. The middle column states only what each vendor's own page says; the first column states only what an Assurance Matrix row proves.

Where you run	What Sanctuary adds (matrix row)	What the harness sandbox gives that Sanctuary never claims	Run both?
macOS, wall armed	OS-level egress enforcement below the agent: a signed operator policy with a clean per-uid allow/deny demonstration that survives attended reboot cycles ("Egress enforcement: macOS", proven; one host and one OS version; not an audited per-rule, per-flow trail). Plus custody ("State encryption", proven), approval gates ("Approval gating", proven), and the hash-chained record ("Tamper-evident audit chain", partial)	Filesystem write limits and process-tree limits on the shell commands the harness runs; a network allowlist the harness itself enforces	Yes. The sandbox is chosen by the harness and can be retried outside of; the wall is imposed by the operator below the agent
macOS, wall not armed	Custody, approval gates, and the record, as above; no egress enforcement	As above	Yes. Without the wall, egress is bounded only by the harness sandbox's own domain list
Ubuntu 24.04 (x86-64)	Kernel egress enforcement per user account on a fresh install of the separate Castle Wall Linux 0.1.0-1 package (a GitHub pre-release, not part of the npm package) ("Egress enforcement: Linux", proven for exactly the claim in the table above and nothing wider). Plus custody, gates, and the record; generated custody needs an unlocked Secret Service	As above	Yes
Other Linux distributions or architectures	Custody, gates, and the record; egress enforcement unproven (the matrix row is Ubuntu 24.04 x86-64 only)	As above	Yes, and treat the wall as absent
Windows	Read-only custody may open an already-enveloped fortress; custody mutation and install readiness fail closed; enforcement roadmapped	Claude Code: unsandboxed on native Windows, sandboxed under WSL2. Codex: a native Windows sandbox in PowerShell and the Linux sandbox under WSL2. Cursor: no Windows sandbox is described	Nothing to arm on the Sanctuary side yet

Harness column sources, each fetched 2026-10-12 (none of the three pages shows a last-updated date; the Cursor page's newest changelog entry is dated 2026-10-01):

Claude Code: Configure the sandboxed Bash tool. The sandbox covers shell commands only and is off by default; it uses Seatbelt on macOS and bubblewrap plus socat on Linux and WSL2; network goes through a local proxy checked against an allowed-domain list; on native Windows commands run unsandboxed; MCP servers, hooks, and the built-in file and web tools run outside it; Claude can ask to retry a failed command unsandboxed.
Codex: Sandboxing. The sandbox constrains which files the agent can modify and whether commands can use the network; Seatbelt on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux and WSL2, a native Windows sandbox in PowerShell; workspace-write is the default mode and danger-full-access removes the filesystem and network boundaries.
Cursor: Run modes. Sandboxed commands read and write inside the workspace; network is blocked by default and then opened per sandbox.json; Seatbelt through sandbox-exec on macOS, Landlock plus seccomp on Linux kernel 6.2 or later with a Bubblewrap fallback; no Windows sandbox is described; a command that fails on a sandbox restriction can be rerun outside it after classifier review.

The argument for why the two layers are different problems: Containment is an isolation problem.

Start here if you read code

In this order, about an hour:

ASSURANCE_MATRIX.md. Every claim, its platform, its evidence, its gap, and the next proof owed. A row reads proven only on a captured drill; a green suite is not a claim.
SANCTUARY_ARCHITECTURE.md. Entry points, data flow, trust model, and the sovereignty properties stated as testable assertions.
server/src/README.md. The module map: 64 modules and 56 barrels (counted 2026-10-13), what each owns, and the names that collide.
The macOS wall drills the matrix cites: allow/deny, [boot su

앞부분만 보여 드려요. 나머지는 저장소에서 읽어 보세요

Sanctuary

개요

PopNx MCP의 세 기둥

할 수 있는 일

설치

설치하기 전에

할 수 있는 일

기본 점검i

제작자와 저장소 일치

계속 관리되고 있음

라이선스 있음

엔드포인트 응답

OAuth로 로그인

도구 설명에 숨겨진 지시 없음

기타 카테고리의 다른 서버와 비교i

자주 묻는 질문

대안

Spec Driven Development

Remote Desktop Commander

yontu

제작자의 README

Sanctuary

Summary for agents

What is proven, and what is not

Why this shape

Sanctuary and your harness's sandbox

Start here if you read code