Spec Driven Development
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
제작자가 쓴 설명(영어 원문)
MCP server for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in and audit-log triage (read-only by default)
이 세 가지는 절대 하나의 점수로 합치지 않아요. 의견, 측정, 인기는 서로 다른 것이니까요.
이 서버는 아직 쉬운 말로 된 요약을 쓰지 못했어요. 아래는 레지스트리에서 읽어 온 사실이에요.
쓰고 있는 AI 앱을 고른 다음 설정을 복사하세요.
필요한 것
어떤 앱을 쓰세요?
위에서 앱을 고르세요. 기억해 두었다가 다음부터는 버튼에 “…에 설치”라고 표시해요.
Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config를 열고 claude_desktop_config.json에 이 내용을 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"entraadm": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"entraadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}터미널에서 이 명령어를 실행하세요
claude mcp add entraadm -- uvx entraadm-mcp프로젝트의 .cursor/mcp.json 또는 ~/.cursor/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"entraadm": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"entraadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
프로젝트의 .vscode/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"servers": {
"entraadm": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"entraadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
이 서버는 내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는데, ChatGPT는 인터넷에 있는 서버에만 연결할 수 있어요. 다른 앱을 고르세요.
선택한 앱은 이 기기의 쿠키에만 저장돼요. 계정은 필요 없어요.
이 설정은 제작자의 레지스트리 정보로 만들었어요. README와 다르면 README를 따르세요.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 설치하면 AI 앱에 도구 목록이 나타나요.
누구나 볼 수 있는 정보를 점검했고, 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 해당하지 않는 항목은 개수에서 뺐어요. · 2026년 11월 8일 점검
레지스트리 이름이 GitHub 계정 shigechika 기준으로 확인되었고, 이 계정이 저장소를 소유하고 있어요
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는 서버라 인터넷 엔드포인트가 없어요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되며, 대신 로컬 설정을 사용해요
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 도구 목록은 인터넷 엔드포인트가 있는 서버에서만 읽을 수 있어요
레지스트리에서 이 카테고리의 활성 서버 전체와 비교했어요. 스타는 게시자가 저장소를 소유한 경우에만 세요.
해당하는 기본 점검 1개 중 1개를 통과했어요. 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 키나 토큰을 넣기 전에 서버가 어떤 권한을 요구하는지 확인하고, 꼭 필요한 권한만 있는 키를 쓰세요.
레지스트리에 필수 키가 나와 있지 않아요. 다만 처음 쓸 때 로그인을 요구하는 서버도 있어요.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. AI 앱이 필요할 때 실행하고, 데이터는 제작자의 서버를 거치지 않아요(서버 자체가 온라인 서비스를 호출하는 경우는 제외).
GitHub 저장소는 마지막으로 – 변경됐고, 최신 버전(1.10.1)은 7일 전 레지스트리에 올라왔어요.
Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code처럼 MCP를 지원하는 앱에서 쓸 수 있어요. 내 컴퓨터에 Python (uv)도 있어야 해요.
같은 카테고리에는: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, aamio rendezvous
같은 카테고리에서 다른 제작자가 만든 서버예요. 스타 순으로 정렬했어요.
카드 보는 법:↓ 주간 다운로드i★ GitHub 스타i세 기둥: 리뷰 · 점검 · 사용 정도i업데이트 = 최신 버전을 레지스트리에 공개한 날i
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
Meet an agent you have not met, exchange messages that expire, and prove it happened. No account.
제작자의 저장소에서 쓰인 그대로 가져왔어요. PopNx MCP가 검토하거나 보증한 내용이 아니에요. HTML, 이미지, 스크립트는 제거했어요. 링크를 누르면 이 사이트를 벗어나요.
English | 日本語
MCP server for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in and audit-log triage, plus the two Azure-side questions a morning patrol asks with the same credential: are our Azure VMs backed up, and is Microsoft 365 itself degraded right now. Read-only, except for one opt-in tool that signs a compromised account out everywhere.
Microsoft ships an official MCP Server for Enterprise for Entra ID data. It is a good fit for an interactive admin at a keyboard, and is not a fit for an unattended triage bot:
az login) fallback for local development.GET/schema-discovery calls against Microsoft Graph. That is flexible for a human, and awkward to put behind an allow-list for an automated triage profile. entraadm-mcp exposes seventeen fixed, read-only tools instead (plus one opt-in write, below).status/errorCode server-side, and has no built-in password-spray view. signin_failure_stats aggregates client-side and flags IPs with failed sign-ins against many distinct users — the pattern Entra's per-account smart lockout does not catch on its own.| Tool | What it answers |
|---|---|
health_check | Is Graph reachable, and can this credential read sign-in logs? |
get_user | Is this account enabled, synced from on-prem, and what are its licenses? |
signin_logs | Why did this user's sign-in fail (or succeed), with the AADSTS code translated? |
signin_failure_stats | Tenant-wide failure aggregation: top error codes, users, apps, source IPs, and password-spray suspects |
signin_success_stats | Tenant-wide success aggregation by source IP: IPs shared by several accounts, legacy-auth (SMTP/IMAP) successes — the view that finds a breach |
compromise_suspects | Which accounts were probably taken over: an outside IP that sprayed many accounts and got into some (spray_breaches), successes from outside the home countries (foreign_successes, high when over a legacy protocol, through Azure CLI / PowerShell, or from 3+ countries within 24 hours), and Microsoft's own risky users when the tenant has Entra ID P2 |
signin_by_ip | Every sign-in from one source IP: who got in from it, who was tried, and when |
directory_audits | Who changed what in the directory (block/unblock, attribute edits), and when? |
get_user_auth_methods | Is MFA actually registered for this account? |
list_subscriptions | Which Azure subscriptions can this credential see? (ARM) |
vm_backup_status | Which Azure VMs are backed up by Azure Backup, did the last backup succeed, and is any recovery point stale? (ARM) |
vm_backup_policies | What schedule and retention do the Azure VM backup policies have? (ARM) |
vm_activity | Did someone restart this Azure VM, or did Azure (host failure, maintenance)? Activity log and Resource Health for a time window (ARM) |
m365_service_health | Is a Microsoft 365 service degraded, and which incidents and advisories are open? |
audit_log_search_start | What did this account (or this IP) do in OneDrive/SharePoint, Exchange and Entra? Submits a Microsoft Purview audit log search, which runs for some minutes in Microsoft 365 |
audit_log_search_result | That search's status, then its records: counts by operation, service, record type, user and client IP (with first/last seen) and a trimmed record list |
daily_brief | One-call summary combining m365_service_health, signin_failure_stats, directory_audits and compromise_suspects (counts and top 5) |
Every tool above is read-only. audit_log_search_start creates a saved audit search object (the one audit_log_search_result then reads) and changes no directory, mailbox or file data. One state-changing tool exists and is off by default:
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
revoke_sign_in_sessions | Signs one account out everywhere (Graph revokeSignInSessions: refresh tokens and session cookies are invalidated). For a confirmed compromise. Registered only when ENTRAADM_ENABLE_REVOKE_SESSIONS=1 |
It looks the account up by exact userPrincipalName first and refuses a guest. Every result has the same keys, including revoked and not_covered: it does not disable the account, reset the password or remove MFA methods, and access tokens already issued keep working until they expire (typically about an hour). revoked is true when Graph confirmed it, false when nothing was done (a refusal, a deadline before the request was sent, a 4xx from Graph), and null when the outcome is unknown (a response lost to a network error, a 5xx after the retries, a deadline after the request was sent, an unreadable success answer); calling again is then safe, revocation is idempotent. Leave the switch unset on any deployment that is not behind its own approval step (a shared gateway, for instance) -- the tool is then absent from tools/list. Unblocking an account and resetting a password stay out of scope.
The four Azure Resource Manager tools live in an Entra-named server on purpose: they use the same app registration and the same azure-identity credential object (a second token scope, https://management.azure.com/.default), run in the same deployment and are covered by the same health_check. A separate server for these tools would double the operational surface. They are governance reads, not resource management; a subscription the credential has no Reader role on simply does not appear in list_subscriptions.
Two auth modes, selected by which environment variables are set:
| Mode | When | Env vars |
|---|---|---|
| app-only | All three set | ENTRAADM_TENANT_ID, ENTRAADM_CLIENT_ID, ENTRAADM_CLIENT_SECRET |
| azure-cli | None set | (uses the current az login session) |
Setting one or two of the three app-only variables is a configuration error and the server refuses to start, rather than silently falling back to a different auth mode than intended.
| Tool(s) | Permission | Notes |
|---|---|---|
get_user (base fields) | User.Read.All | |
signin_logs, signin_failure_stats, signin_success_stats, compromise_suspects, signin_by_ip, directory_audits, get_user's sign_in_activity field | AuditLog.Read.All (app-only) or the Reports Reader directory role (delegated) | |
get_user_auth_methods | UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All | App-only only; not available under delegated (az login) auth in a typical tenant role assignment |
m365_service_health, daily_brief's service_health section | ServiceHealth.Read.All | Under delegated auth the signed-in user also needs an Entra role that may read service health (for example Service Support Administrator or Global Reader) |
audit_log_search_start, audit_log_search_result | AuditLogsQuery.Read.All, or the service-scoped AuditLogsQuery-OneDrive.Read.All / AuditLogsQuery-SharePoint.Read.All / AuditLogsQuery-Exchange.Read.All / AuditLogsQuery-Entra.Read.All (application permissions) | Optional. With only a service-scoped permission, pass the matching service. Each search counts against the tenant's audit search limits (searches per day, searches running at once); a 429 comes back as rate_limited: true and is not retried |
compromise_suspects' microsoft_risky_users, the identity_protection probe (health_check, daily_brief) | IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All | Optional. Identity Protection needs Entra ID P2: without it Graph answers 403 "not licensed" and the probe reports not_licensed; nothing else changes |
revoke_sign_in_sessions (opt-in) | User.RevokeSessions.All (app-only) or the User Administrator / Helpdesk Administrator directory role (delegated; Privileged Authentication Administrator for an administrator account) | Only when ENTRAADM_ENABLE_REVOKE_SESSIONS=1. A write permission: grant it only to a deployment that needs the tool. The account lookup before it needs User.Read.All. Without the permission the tool answers missing_permission for the auth mode in use and nothing changes |
| Tool(s) | Role | Notes |
|---|---|---|
list_subscriptions | none | Lists whatever the credential can see; an empty list means no role has been granted anywhere yet |
vm_backup_status, vm_backup_policies, vm_activity | Reader on each subscription | Reader is */read and covers every endpoint used. Backup Reader alone is not enough (it has no Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/read). Granted to the service principal (app-only) or to the signed-in user (azure-cli) |
Azure RBAC is optional: health_check reports ARM reachability and the number of visible subscriptions as an informational arm probe that never changes status, so a deployment used only for Entra triage stays healthy.
A missing permission never crashes a tool. It degrades that tool (or that one field) to {"error": "...", "missing_permission": "..."} with a human-readable explanation of what role or permission is needed, so health_check and every other tool stay usable even before full permissions are granted.
Identity Protection (Entra ID P2). compromise_suspects adds Microsoft's own risk verdicts when the tenant has them: a cheap riskyUsers?$top=1 probe classifies each tenant as licensed, not_licensed (403 "not licensed": no Entra ID P2), no_permission (other 403: no IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All) or error; licensed and not_licensed are cached for an hour (a 200 whose rows say riskLevel: hidden also means no P2). The endpoint itself is probed: /subscribedSkus can be refused and a SKU list would still have to be mapped to P2. health_check reports it per tenant without changing status, and daily_brief's summary per tenant, so the day P2 appears is noticed. Licensed: microsoft_risky_users lists open (atRisk / confirmedCompromised) high-risk users and, separately, medium, marking those also in spray_breaches / foreign_successes. counts are then distinct accounts over every finding, before the lists are cut: high is any account high here or in Microsoft's high list, medium any medium here or in Microsoft's medium list that is not high (counts.microsoft_high / microsoft_medium say how many Microsoft lists). Otherwise the section is {available: false, reason} and nothing else changes -- never read it as "no risky users".
uv tool install entraadm-mcp
pip install entraadm-mcp
Set the three app-only variables for production/unattended use:
export ENTRAADM_TENANT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
export ENTRAADM_CLIENT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 export ENTRAADM_CLIENT_SECRET=your-client-secret
Or leave all three unset and run az login first for local development.
Optional:
# Default page cap for the log-scanning tools (1-50, default 50).
export ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT=50
앞부분만 보여 드려요. 나머지는 저장소에서 읽어 보세요