Phishnoo Sandbox
Explore synthetic security awareness metrics and file example threat reports.
클라우드에서 실행✓ api.phishnoo.nl
Google Workspace Admin Security-Audit MCP
개요
제작자가 쓴 설명(영어 원문)
MCP server for Google Workspace security auditing — login audit, external sharing, daily brief
PopNx MCP의 세 기둥
이 세 가지는 절대 하나의 점수로 합치지 않아요. 의견, 측정, 인기는 서로 다른 것이니까요.
- 사용자 의견i아직 리뷰가 없어요리뷰는 다음 단계에서 계정 기능과 함께 열려요
- 우리의 기본 점검i1개 중 1개 통과공개된 정보로 점검했으며, 코드는 아직 스캔하지 않았어요
- 사용 정도i아주 새로움↓ 81/주 · ★ –
할 수 있는 일
이 서버는 아직 쉬운 말로 된 요약을 쓰지 못했어요. 아래는 레지스트리에서 읽어 온 사실이에요.
- 연결 방식: 내 컴퓨터에서 실행
- 전송 방식: stdio
- 카테고리: 사이버 보안
설치
쓰고 있는 AI 앱을 고른 다음 설정을 복사하세요.
설치하기 전에
- 기본 점검: 1개 중 1개 통과
- 내 컴퓨터에서 내 사용자 계정의 권한(파일, 네트워크, 앱)으로 실행돼요.
- 레지스트리에 입력해야 할 키가 나와 있지 않아요.
필요한 것
- PyPIPython의 uv 설치(uvx 명령어용)
어떤 앱을 쓰세요?
위에서 앱을 고르세요. 기억해 두었다가 다음부터는 버튼에 “…에 설치”라고 표시해요.
Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config를 열고 claude_desktop_config.json에 이 내용을 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"gwsadm": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"gwsadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}터미널에서 이 명령어를 실행하세요
claude mcp add gwsadm -- uvx gwsadm-mcp또는 설정을 직접 복사하기
프로젝트의 .cursor/mcp.json 또는 ~/.cursor/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"gwsadm": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"gwsadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
또는 설정을 직접 복사하기
프로젝트의 .vscode/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"servers": {
"gwsadm": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"gwsadm-mcp"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
이 서버는 내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는데, ChatGPT는 인터넷에 있는 서버에만 연결할 수 있어요. 다른 앱을 고르세요.
선택한 앱은 이 기기의 쿠키에만 저장돼요. 계정은 필요 없어요.
이 설정은 제작자의 레지스트리 정보로 만들었어요. README와 다르면 README를 따르세요.
할 수 있는 일
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 설치하면 AI 앱에 도구 목록이 나타나요.
기본 점검i
누구나 볼 수 있는 정보를 점검했고, 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 해당하지 않는 항목은 개수에서 뺐어요. · 2026년 11월 8일 점검
- ✓ 통과
제작자와 저장소 일치
레지스트리 이름이 GitHub 계정 shigechika 기준으로 확인되었고, 이 계정이 저장소를 소유하고 있어요
- … 아직 점검 안 함
계속 관리되고 있음
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
- … 아직 점검 안 함
라이선스 있음
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
- – 해당 없음
엔드포인트 응답
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는 서버라 인터넷 엔드포인트가 없어요
- – 해당 없음
OAuth로 로그인
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되며, 대신 로컬 설정을 사용해요
- … 아직 점검 안 함
도구 설명에 숨겨진 지시 없음
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 도구 목록은 인터넷 엔드포인트가 있는 서버에서만 읽을 수 있어요
사이버 보안 카테고리의 다른 서버와 비교i
- 이 카테고리의 다른 서버 1000개 중 0%보다 스타가 많아요
- 이 카테고리의 다른 서버 1000개 중 74%보다 최근에 레지스트리에 공개됐어요
- 기본 점검 결과가 이 카테고리의 다른 서버 1000개 중 100%와 같거나 더 좋아요
레지스트리에서 이 카테고리의 활성 서버 전체와 비교했어요. 스타는 게시자가 저장소를 소유한 경우에만 세요.
자주 묻는 질문
Google Workspace Admin Security-Audit MCP, 안전한가요?
해당하는 기본 점검 1개 중 1개를 통과했어요. 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 키나 토큰을 넣기 전에 서버가 어떤 권한을 요구하는지 확인하고, 꼭 필요한 권한만 있는 키를 쓰세요.
어떤 키나 코드가 필요한가요?
레지스트리에 필수 키가 나와 있지 않아요. 다만 처음 쓸 때 로그인을 요구하는 서버도 있어요.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되나요, 클라우드에서 실행되나요?
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. AI 앱이 필요할 때 실행하고, 데이터는 제작자의 서버를 거치지 않아요(서버 자체가 온라인 서비스를 호출하는 경우는 제외).
아직 관리되고 있나요?
GitHub 저장소는 마지막으로 – 변경됐고, 최신 버전(0.23.1)은 13일 전 레지스트리에 올라왔어요.
어떤 앱에서 쓸 수 있나요?
Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code처럼 MCP를 지원하는 앱에서 쓸 수 있어요. 내 컴퓨터에 Python (uv)도 있어야 해요.
대신 쓸 수 있는 건 뭐가 있나요?
같은 카테고리에는: Phishnoo Sandbox, Zovo Dependency Audit, TeamOnly
대안
같은 카테고리에서 다른 제작자가 만든 서버예요. 스타 순으로 정렬했어요.
카드 보는 법:↓ 주간 다운로드i★ GitHub 스타i세 기둥: 리뷰 · 점검 · 사용 정도i업데이트 = 최신 버전을 레지스트리에 공개한 날i
Zovo Dependency Audit
Audit a dependency list for known vulnerabilities, licenses and outdated versions.
클라우드에서 실행
TeamOnly
Deploy AI-built internal apps behind your company login, with a database, files and secrets.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행✓ teamonly.dev
제작자의 README
README 열기
제작자의 저장소에서 쓰인 그대로 가져왔어요. PopNx MCP가 검토하거나 보증한 내용이 아니에요. HTML, 이미지, 스크립트는 제거했어요. 링크를 누르면 이 사이트를 벗어나요.
gwsadm-mcp
English | 日本語
Google Workspace security-audit MCP (Model Context Protocol) server — read-only visibility into account locks, suspicious logins, and external file sharing, built on the Admin SDK Reports API (audit activities).
Named after the admin-console viewpoint (gwsadm = Google Workspace admin), sibling of boxadm-mcp. This is not a general-purpose Workspace MCP: it surfaces risk and changes nothing, with one opt-in exception — sign_out_user, which exists only when the server is started with GWSADM_ENABLE_SIGN_OUT=1.
Features
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
health_check | Server version, config path, and per-domain auth probe — call at session start or after a timeout |
login_audit | Reports API login — accounts auto-disabled by Google (account_disabled_*: leaked password, hijacked, spamming), suspicious logins, failure top-N |
gmail_usage_report | Reports API customerUsageReports — daily Gmail send/receive counts per domain, one date at a time, ending yesterday (the API's own UTC-8:00/PST date anchor). Requires the separate admin.reports.usage.readonly DWD scope (see Auth model below) — a DIFFERENT grant from admin.reports.audit.readonly even though both are Reports API |
suspended_accounts | Directory API — current snapshot of suspended accounts (isSuspended=true); cross-reference against a downstream IdP (e.g. KeyCloak) to find suspended-but-still-enabled accounts |
get_user | Directory API users().get — one named account's current state: suspended (with reason and time), archived, last_login, 2SV enrolled/enforced, org unit, creation time, pending password change. The "why can't this person sign in" lookup: one request, no pagination, for an address you already know — unlike suspended_accounts, which lists only accounts that ARE suspended, so it can never confirm that a given address is *not* suspended (and once that list exceeds its page cap, absence stops being evidence either way). Needs no scope beyond the one suspended_accounts already uses |
user_oauth_tokens | Directory API tokens().list — third-party OAuth app grants for one user; a compromise vector login_audit is blind to, since a previously-granted token needs no fresh login. Domain resolved from the username's suffix, with an optional domain override for alias/secondary-domain addresses |
sign_out_user | State-changing, opt-in. Directory API users().signOut — signs one account out of every web and device session and resets its sign-in cookies, after confirming the account exists with users().get. Registered only when the server starts with GWSADM_ENABLE_SIGN_OUT=1; put an approval step in front of it. Does not revoke OAuth grants or app passwords, remove an enrolled second factor or change the password (listed in its not_covered). Needs two grants: admin.directory.user.readonly for the account check (as get_user) and admin.directory.user.security for the sign-out itself (as user_oauth_tokens); the impersonated admin must also be allowed to manage user security. Answers signed_out true (Google confirmed), false (nothing changed) or null (outcome unknown: sent, no answer in time) with the same keys every time, and ends within GWSADM_SIGN_OUT_DEADLINE_SECONDS (default 45). The address's own domain must be configured; domain, if given, must match it. |
user_activity | Reports API activities().list with userKey= — everything one account did in a window, merged across applications (login, token, user_accounts, drive, groups, calendar, chat, meet, saml by default) newest first. flags surfaces the events that change the account's security posture regardless of volume — 2SV enrolled/disabled, recovery email/phone changed, password changed, outbound forwarding, Google's risky_sensitive_action_* / suspicious_login verdicts, every OAuth authorize with client and scopes — because a second factor the attacker enrolled survives a password reset; ips lists the distinct source addresses with first/last seen. Google's own account_disabled_* / suspicious_login verdicts are not served under the account's userKey (their actor is Google), so they are fetched the way login_audit does and reported under the synthetic application login_verdicts. The post-compromise question login_audit cannot answer: it sees only the events Google itself raised, domain-wide |
ip_activity | Reports API activities().list with actorIpAddress= — every account one source address acted as, per domain and application, with the same flags. The follow-through after user_activity names an attacker's address: did the same source reach other accounts? A spray shows up as login_failure counts before it ever succeeds |
compromise_sweep | The Google-side follow-through after one account is confirmed compromised, in one call: activity (user_activity, flags first), state / grants (get_user; OAuth grants with mail / Drive / contacts / admin scopes called out as risky), ips (ip_activity across every domain for the attacker's addresses — given, or taken from the account's own flags — with the account itself excluded), and gmail: the settings an attacker leaves behind to keep reading mail (auto-forwarding, forwarding addresses, filters that forward / delete / archive, delegates, send-as and reply-to) plus what the mailbox sent in the window as counts and recipient domains — never a subject or body. gmail.kind says whether it could be read at all: ok / partial (one settings section or the sent summary failed; the rest stands) / api_disabled (the Gmail API is off in the service account's own Cloud project) / no_grant / error — a failure is reported, never read as "nothing found". highlights lists the facts to act on, checklist what remains to do by hand. Shares gmail_message_trace's gmail.readonly DWD scope (every settings read, delegates.list included, is served by it — verified live) |
drive_external_sharing | Reports API drive — ACL grants to external addresses or domains (revocations reported separately) and visibility transitions into link/public exposure |
drive_doc_activity | Reports API drive with a server-side doc_id filter — one document's owner, ACL changes, and lifecycle events. Triage companion to drive_external_sharing: the owner (an individual vs. a shared drive's name) disambiguates the shared-drive false-positive class, where files created inside a shared drive propagate member ACLs and read as bulk external sharing |
shared_drive_membership_changes | Reports API drive (shared_drive_membership_change) — who added/removed/re-roled shared-drive members and when, with external classification of the affected member and a client-side drive-name filter |
admin_actions | Reports API admin — what administrators (people, or a sync or API client acting as one) did in the Admin console: to one user or group (server-side USER_EMAIL / GROUP_EMAIL filters on the target's domain) or tenant-wide. Answers "who suspended this account / reset its password / took it out of a group?", which user_activity cannot: an admin event's actor is the administrator, not the account acted upon |
workspace_status | Google Workspace Status Dashboard (public feed, no credential) — open incidents and those that ended within the window, optionally for one product (Gmail, Drive, ...). Answers "is it Google?" before a tenant-side investigation |
gmail_message_trace | Gmail API — did a known Message-ID reach specific mailboxes, and where (inbox/spam/trash/archived)? For each recipient it impersonates that user via DWD and searches their own mailbox. Requires the separate gmail.readonly DWD scope (see Auth model below); a domain missing that grant reports a per-recipient error, never a false "not found" |
dmarc_rua_summary | Gmail API — DMARC aggregate (RUA) report pass/fail summary and top reject-candidate source IPs, per domain. Impersonates the domain's configured dmarc_rua_mailbox (a real user; default postmaster@ ), searches it for mail addressed to dmarc_rua_recipient (the published rua= address, e.g. postmaster+rua@; default: the mailbox) and reads the compressed report attachments those messages carry. Shares gmail_message_trace's gmail.readonly DWD scope, but unlike that tool this one DOES read attachment content (the report XML), not just metadata — see Auth model below |
group_delivery_policy | Groups Settings API — a Google Group's own posting/delivery policy (who_can_post, allow_external_members, moderation levels). A group's access control sits in front of Gmail delivery: a domain-only posting policy silently drops an external sender's mail before it generates any Gmail delivery event at all, indistinguishable from a delivery failure without reading the policy directly. Requires the separate apps.groups.settings DWD scope (see Auth model below) |
list_group_members | Directory API — a Google Group's basic metadata and member roster, resolved directly rather than inferred from who happened to receive one particular message. Requires the separate admin.directory.group.readonly and admin.directory.group.member.readonly DWD scopes (see Auth model below) |
daily_brief | One-call summary across all configured domains, including account-protection changes (2-Step Verification, passkeys, Advanced Protection, password, recovery address/phone, mail forwarding out of the domain) flagged when they come from outside your home countries (GWSADM_IP2ASN, GWSADM_HOME_COUNTRIES), from an origin that cannot be placed, or follow a suspicious login |
daily_brief_start / daily_brief_result | Same as daily_brief, run in the background: start returns a job_id immediately, then poll result(job_id) until done. Use on large tenants where the synchronous call risks the client's ~60s tool-call timeout |
Planned: dlp_events (Reports rules; requires a Workspace edition with DLP), token_events.
Auth model
Service account with domain-wide delegation (DWD) impersonating an audit-capable admin. Fully non-interactive — no browser, no token refresh rotation — so the server runs unattended (cron, MCP gateway, CI).
Grant all of the following DWD scopes on the same service-account client ID up front, in one setup pass. Adding them one at a time as each tool gets built is how a scope goes missing until the one tool that needed it starts degrading — one place, one pass, avoids the trap:
| Scope | Needed by | Missing it |
|---|---|---|
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/admin.reports.audit.readonly | login_audit, user_activity, ip_activity, admin_actions, drive_external_sharing, drive_doc_activity, shared_drive_membership_changes, daily_brief* | those tools degrade to a per-domain error |
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/admin.directory.user.readonly | suspended_accounts, get_user, sign_out_user (opt-in; its account check) | those tools degrade to an error (per-domain for suspended_accounts); everything else keeps working |
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/admin.directory.user.security | user_oauth_tokens, sign_out_user (opt-in) | those tools degrade to a per-domain error; everything else keeps working |
health_check needs no scope at all to respond: it is the tool to call when a grant might be missing — it probes each domain and reports the failing auth in a structured per-domain result instead of failing itself.
gmail_usage_report needs its own separate scope too, despite living under the same Admin SDK Reports API as the base pass above — the "Usage report" family (customerUsageReports) and the "Audit" activ
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