Spec Driven Development
제작자: formulahendry
MCP Server that facilitates spec-driven development workflows, not just Vibe Coding.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행★ 440MIT14개월 전 업데이트
설치
TollWarden
개요
제작자가 쓴 설명(영어 원문)
Screens x402 payments before settlement for injected payee addresses and sellers who never deliver.
PopNx MCP의 세 기둥
이 세 가지는 절대 하나의 점수로 합치지 않아요. 의견, 측정, 인기는 서로 다른 것이니까요.
- 사용자 의견i아직 리뷰가 없어요리뷰는 다음 단계에서 계정 기능과 함께 열려요
- 우리의 기본 점검i1개 중 1개 통과공개된 정보로 점검했으며, 코드는 아직 스캔하지 않았어요
- 사용 정도i아직 측정 안 함★ –
할 수 있는 일
이 서버는 아직 쉬운 말로 된 요약을 쓰지 못했어요. 아래는 레지스트리에서 읽어 온 사실이에요.
- 연결 방식: 내 컴퓨터에서 실행
- 전송 방식: stdio
- 카테고리: 기타
설치
쓰고 있는 AI 앱을 고른 다음 설정을 복사하세요.
설치하기 전에
- 기본 점검: 1개 중 1개 통과
- 내 컴퓨터에서 내 사용자 계정의 권한(파일, 네트워크, 앱)으로 실행돼요.
- 레지스트리에 입력해야 할 키가 나와 있지 않아요.
필요한 것
- npmNode.js 설치(npx 명령어용)
어떤 앱을 쓰세요?
위에서 앱을 고르세요. 기억해 두었다가 다음부터는 버튼에 “…에 설치”라고 표시해요.
Claude Desktop → Settings → Developer → Edit Config를 열고 claude_desktop_config.json에 이 내용을 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"tollwarden": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"tollwarden"
]
}
}
}터미널에서 이 명령어를 실행하세요
claude mcp add tollwarden -- npx -y tollwarden또는 설정을 직접 복사하기
프로젝트의 .cursor/mcp.json 또는 ~/.cursor/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"mcpServers": {
"tollwarden": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"tollwarden"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
또는 설정을 직접 복사하기
프로젝트의 .vscode/mcp.json에 붙여 넣으세요
{
"servers": {
"tollwarden": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"tollwarden"
]
}
}
}브라우저가 앱을 열지 물어본 다음, 앱이 설정을 보여 주고 확인을 요청해요. 키 값은 비워 두니 직접 입력하세요.
이 서버는 내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는데, ChatGPT는 인터넷에 있는 서버에만 연결할 수 있어요. 다른 앱을 고르세요.
선택한 앱은 이 기기의 쿠키에만 저장돼요. 계정은 필요 없어요.
이 설정은 제작자의 레지스트리 정보로 만들었어요. README와 다르면 README를 따르세요.
할 수 있는 일
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 설치하면 AI 앱에 도구 목록이 나타나요.
기본 점검i
누구나 볼 수 있는 정보를 점검했고, 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 해당하지 않는 항목은 개수에서 뺐어요. · 2026년 11월 6일 점검
- ✓ 통과
제작자와 저장소 일치
레지스트리 이름이 도메인 tollwarden.com 기준으로 확인되었어요(레지스트리가 도메인 소유를 확인해요)
- … 아직 점검 안 함
계속 관리되고 있음
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
- … 아직 점검 안 함
라이선스 있음
아직 GitHub에서 이 저장소를 읽어 오지 않았어요
- – 해당 없음
엔드포인트 응답
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되는 서버라 인터넷 엔드포인트가 없어요
- – 해당 없음
OAuth로 로그인
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되며, 대신 로컬 설정을 사용해요
- … 아직 점검 안 함
도구 설명에 숨겨진 지시 없음
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. 도구 목록은 인터넷 엔드포인트가 있는 서버에서만 읽을 수 있어요
기타 카테고리의 다른 서버와 비교i
- 이 카테고리의 다른 서버 32464개 중 0%보다 스타가 많아요
- 이 카테고리의 다른 서버 32464개 중 48%보다 최근에 레지스트리에 공개됐어요
- 기본 점검 결과가 이 카테고리의 다른 서버 32464개 중 100%와 같거나 더 좋아요
레지스트리에서 이 카테고리의 활성 서버 전체와 비교했어요. 스타는 게시자가 저장소를 소유한 경우에만 세요.
자주 묻는 질문
TollWarden, 안전한가요?
해당하는 기본 점검 1개 중 1개를 통과했어요. 코드는 읽지 않았어요. 키나 토큰을 넣기 전에 서버가 어떤 권한을 요구하는지 확인하고, 꼭 필요한 권한만 있는 키를 쓰세요.
어떤 키나 코드가 필요한가요?
레지스트리에 필수 키가 나와 있지 않아요. 다만 처음 쓸 때 로그인을 요구하는 서버도 있어요.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행되나요, 클라우드에서 실행되나요?
내 컴퓨터에서 실행돼요. AI 앱이 필요할 때 실행하고, 데이터는 제작자의 서버를 거치지 않아요(서버 자체가 온라인 서비스를 호출하는 경우는 제외).
아직 관리되고 있나요?
GitHub 저장소는 마지막으로 – 변경됐고, 최신 버전(1.6.0)은 지난달 레지스트리에 올라왔어요.
어떤 앱에서 쓸 수 있나요?
Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code처럼 MCP를 지원하는 앱에서 쓸 수 있어요. 내 컴퓨터에 Node.js도 있어야 해요.
대신 쓸 수 있는 건 뭐가 있나요?
같은 카테고리에는: Spec Driven Development, Remote Desktop Commander, yontu
대안
같은 카테고리에서 다른 제작자가 만든 서버예요. 스타 순으로 정렬했어요.
카드 보는 법:★ GitHub 스타i세 기둥: 리뷰 · 점검 · 사용 정도i업데이트 = 최신 버전을 레지스트리에 공개한 날i
Remote Desktop Commander
제작자: desktop-commander
Remote Desktop Commander: use files, terminal and processes on your own computers from any AI app.
클라우드에서 실행★ 211어제 업데이트
설치
yontu
제작자: senrecep
Türkçe yazı denetimi: TDK kuralları, yapay zekâ izleri, metin türüne göre üslup.
내 컴퓨터에서 실행오늘 업데이트
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제작자의 README
README 열기
제작자의 저장소에서 쓰인 그대로 가져왔어요. PopNx MCP가 검토하거나 보증한 내용이 아니에요. HTML, 이미지, 스크립트는 제거했어요. 링크를 누르면 이 사이트를 벗어나요.
TollWarden
A payment security firewall for [x402](https://x402.org) — screen every micropayment before it settles.
Agents that pay over x402 get drained in predictable ways: secrets leak through payment metadata, captured authorizations get replayed, quoted prices get inflated, and poisoned web content tricks agents into paying addresses they never planned to pay. TollWarden is one POST before settlement that checks for all of it and returns allow / flag / block with machine-readable, per-check reasons — in ~0.6 ms.
TollWarden is advisory and non-custodial: it never touches private keys, wallets, or funds. It wraps around whatever facilitator and wallet your agent already uses. And it's a first-class x402 seller itself — its endpoints are paid via the official x402 middleware, settle through the Coinbase CDP facilitator, and carry Bazaar discovery metadata.
Agent decides to pay ──► POST /v1/scan/outgoing ──► allow ──► wallet settles│ ├──► flag ──► agent pauses / confirms intent └──► block ──► wallet refuses (reason attached)
Use it in 30 seconds
npm install @tollwarden/client # TypeScript/Nodepip install tollwarden # Python
import { TollWardenClient, TollWardenBlockedError } from "@tollwarden/client";const tollwarden = new TollWardenClient({ agentId: "my-agent" }); // free API key auto-minted, 100 free scans
tollwarden.observe(fetchedPageText, { sourceUrl }); // tag what your agent just read → injection detection await tollwarden.guardOutgoing(payment); // throws TollWardenBlockedError on a block verdict
New here? [Protect your x402 agent in 5 minutes →](QUICKSTART.md)
The SDK (sdk/, zero dependencies) also verifies every verdict's Ed25519 attestation against a pinned key, tracks your free-call quota, and can subscribe to plans autonomously. Wallet authors get standalone verifyAttestation() / computePaymentCommitment() — and the enforcement kit: new TollWardenEnforcer({ trustedKeyHex }).guardSigner(account) wraps any viem/ethers signer so it physically refuses to sign an x402 payment authorization without a fresh, payment-bound allow-verdict.
Framework integrations
Building on an agent framework? TollWarden ships drop-in packages that give your agent "scan before you pay" in about two lines — a toolset plus a provenance mechanism that auto-tags what the agent reads, so the prompt-injection-triggered-payment detector works without any prompt engineering:
| Framework | Package | Install |
|---|---|---|
| LangChain | langchain-tollwarden | pip install langchain-tollwarden |
| CrewAI | crewai-tollwarden | pip install crewai-tollwarden |
| NeMo Agent Toolkit | nemo-tollwarden | pip install nemo-tollwarden |
| Coinbase AgentKit | agentkit-tollwarden | pip install agentkit-tollwarden |
| Vercel AI SDK | @tollwarden/ai-sdk | npm install @tollwarden/ai-sdk |
Each exposes the same three tools (scan / check reputation / report) and a framework-native way to feed what the agent read into injection detection. LangChain uses a callback, CrewAI an after-tool-call hook and the Vercel AI SDK an onStepFinish handler, and all three tag it automatically. NeMo and AgentKit take it as an explicit content argument, and the AgentKit action also fills in the payer from the agent's own wallet. Every package also ships a guarded_payment / guardedPayment wrapper for enforcement by construction (the payment executor never runs on a block verdict), and the NeMo one accepts an async executor. See each package's README for the two-line setup, or its page under tollwarden.com/integrations.
What it catches
The AI agent payment security guide walks through the attacks these checks answer, one failure mode at a time, with each check's limits.
Core detectors
| Check | What it catches |
|---|---|
| PII / secret detection | EVM private keys, seed phrases, AWS/OpenAI/Anthropic/GitHub/Slack keys, JWTs, ?api_key= URL credentials, SSNs, Luhn-validated card numbers, emails, phones — in resource_url, description, reason, and metadata, *before* they're transmitted |
| Replay detection | Nonce reuse (stale or captured payment authorizations), scoped network:payer:nonce, configurable TTL window |
| Duplicate purchase | The same purchase authorized twice. x402 clients sign a fresh authorization for every 402 they see, so a retried request arrives as a second valid payment with a new nonce, which nonce-replay checks admit and which can settle alongside the first. An outgoing scan that matches your previous scan of the same purchase (payer, pay_to, asset, amount, resource_url) within 60 s under a different authorization is flagged replay.duplicate_purchase. On API-key scans the flag names the earlier scan_id. Anonymous scope is client-declared, so there the flag never echoes another caller's id. A pre-sign scan and the post-sign scan of the same authorization count once. Deliberate repeats clear it: pass the earlier scan's scan_id as context.repeat_of (one attempt at a time), or report the earlier attempt's outcome as delivered, which the SDK payment wrappers do automatically when a paid call succeeds. not_delivered does not clear it, because that is the attempt that gets retried. Flag-only, since TollWarden sees scans, not settlements, and cannot know the first one settled. A blocked payment records nothing |
| Overpayment detection | Above a configurable multiple of expected price (flag ≥3×, block ≥10×) plus an absolute ceiling |
| Prompt-injection-triggered payments | Payments whose *decision* originated from content the agent just read (tool result / fetched page) rather than its own planning step; escalates on weighted injection tells in that content (override/redirect phrasing across a broad verb/object corpus and in 8 languages: English, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, Russian, Chinese, Japanese; spoofed system/chat-template/Guidance markers, smuggled model boundary tokens, fabricated conversation turns, concealment, business-email-compromise phrasing — "our payment address has changed, no need to verify" — and urgency pressure), with extra weight when a tell sits near an address-like token. Scored the way injections are shaped: weak tells only add up when they cluster, pressure alone (urgency, transcript form, hidden characters) never blocks, and a human's own "pay X to 0x…" instruction is not scored against them. Content is scanned both raw and with HTML tags, entities and markdown emphasis stripped, so **Ignore** all previous instructions reads as the sentence it renders as. Blocks when the pay_to address itself came from that content — even split across lines or separators, missing its 0x, or laced with invisible characters |
| Resource URL risk (incoming) | IP-literal hosts, punycode/homoglyphs, link shorteners, user@host tricks, non-HTTPS, credential demands ("send your seed phrase") |
| Counterparty reputation | Shared post-hoc report registry, cross-checked on every scan; reporting is always free. Blocked injection scans also feed it automatically: a wallet caught being planted in just-read content (or used as vanity-bait) is flagged on every agent's future scans of it — one detection becomes network-wide protection (flag-only; scan inputs are client-supplied) |
| Delivery outcomes | Measured, commitment-bound delivery history per counterparty — a clean payment to a seller who never ships still fails you. Sellers with low delivery rates or repeated no-ships get flagged (never blocked: H-2 applies to measured history too) |
Zero-latency hardening tier — checks that hold even when the calling agent's narration is compromised:
| Check | What it catches |
|---|---|
| Velocity limits | ≥N scans/min (flag; block at 2×), cumulative hourly spend cap — rate and spend are observed facts, not self-reports. Scoped to the account behind your API key, so a fresh agent_id per request opens no new window; only anonymous scans fall back to agent_id/payer. A payment TollWarden blocks still takes a rate slot but adds nothing to the hourly spend, so a seller's absurd quote, refused at the ceiling, does not lock you out of paying anyone else for the next hour |
| First-contact size cap | First payment to a never-seen counterparty above a threshold |
| Asset verification | asset contract that isn't canonical USDC on the declared network (lookalike-token attack). The network may be a CAIP-2 id or an x402 v1 name (base, base-sepolia, polygon, ethereum); both reach the same check |
| Merchant pinning (TOFU) | Two tiers. Your account's own pin: pay_to rotation on a domain *you* have paid before → block — nobody else can have written that record. Shared observation: the first address *any* caller presented for the domain; a mismatch there is a flag ("another caller saw a different address"), because both sides are client input — it becomes a block only once the non-blocking CDP Bazaar cross-check has verified the pinned address as the domain's merchant. Pin age and the named corroboration sources ship as signed attestation fields (see below), so a wallet can tell a four-minute-old pin from a six-month-old one instead of trusting both equally |
| Address poisoning | pay_to that matches a counterparty you have paid, your own pinned merchant, or a CDP-verified pin on its first + last characters but differs in the middle — the truncated-display ("0x2096…287C") vanity-address attack → block. A lookalike of an address some *other* caller merely presented → flag, so a stranger cannot seed a vanity "pin" and get your honest payment blocked as the lookalike. Also catches bait: a near-copy of the recipient or a trusted address *planted in the content the agent just read*. Blocked payments are rolled back out of trust state, so repeat attempts keep detecting |
| ScoutScore trust signal (opt-in) | Merchant domains rated LOW/VERY_LOW by ScoutScore (spam farms, template clones, dead endpoints) → flag, clearly labeled as an external third-party signal. Lookups are async + cached (zero scan latency), share the domain only, and can never block on their own. Enable with SCOUTSCORE=on |
| Known-bad list | O(1) membership against a curated/synced badlist |
| Deep content analysis | Encoded/obfuscated injection payloads decoded and rescanned: base64 (both alphabets, line-wrapped, space-chunked, double-encoded), hex, percent-encoding, HTML entities, JS/JSON \x/\u escapes, Unicode tag-character smuggling ("invisible ASCII"), zero-width and homoglyph obfuscation (Cyrillic, Greek, IPA, small capitals, dotless-i — plus a mixed-script-word signal for lookalikes the fold table does not know), leetspeak (1gn0re) and letter-spacing (i g n o r e). Every pass is linear in the 200 KB content cap and guarded by a latency test. Bypassed below MICRO_BYPASS_USD (default $0.005) per payment, but drip-resistant: once cumulative scanned spend to a counterparty crosses the same threshold, the deep tier runs an
앞부분만 보여 드려요. 나머지는 저장소에서 읽어 보세요