REA
Reverse engineer anything from your terminal or agent with one CLI and MCP server.
Claude Code skill for OWASP security best practices (2025-2026). Includes Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, Agentic AI security, and 20+ language-specific security quirks.
제작자라면 이 코드를 README에 붙여 넣으세요. 배지는 이 페이지로 연결됩니다.
[](https://mcp.popnx.com/en/skills/agamm-claude-code-owasp)같은 작업에서 AI를 서비스에 연결하는 MCP
Reverse engineer anything from your terminal or agent with one CLI and MCP server.
Codebase intelligence for TypeScript and JavaScript, exposed as structured MCP analysis tools.
MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management
같은 종류의 작업, Skill 목록과 같은 순서
| 이 항목 claude-code-owasp | rea | graphify | MoneyPrinterTurbo | archify | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 제작자 | agamm | morluto | Graphify-Labs | harry0703 | tt-a1i |
| Skill 수 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| GitHub 별 | 450 | 463,254 | 148,775 | 143,788 | 97,049 |
| 마지막 코드 변경 | 2026년 11월 4일 | 2026년 11월 16일 | 2026년 11월 16일 | 2026년 11월 13일 | 2026년 11월 15일 |
| 라이선스 | MIT | MIT | Apache-2.0 | MIT | Apache-2.0 |
agamm의 Skill(지시 묶음) 1개, AI가 읽고 그대로 일해요 · MCP server가 아니에요
MCP = 손
AI를 외부 서비스나 데이터에 연결합니다(예: Notion 읽기, 청구서 만들기). 프로그램이나 서버가 실행 중이어야 합니다.
Skill = 안내서
작업 방법을 AI에게 가르치는 텍스트 파일. 어떤 서비스에도 연결되지 않습니다.
겹치는 경우도 있습니다. 도구를 부르는 스크립트가 있는 Skill도, 지식만 보내는 MCP도 있습니다. 하려는 작업을 기준으로 고르세요.
Claude Code
제작자 README와 repo 폴더 기준
GitHub account agamm (person), 14 years old
★ 450 stars, few users so far · code last changed 2026년 11월 4일
No, plain text files the AI reads and follows
No scripts, so it does not go online by itself
No hooks or writes to machine settings found
Checked automatically from the repo files at commit 1ae29cb (read only, nothing was run). Not a safety guarantee: read it and decide for yourself
먼저: 어떤 AI를 쓰시나요
쓰는 앱을 고르면 그 앱의 설치 방법만 보여 드립니다
Uploading to claude.ai would fail: the description is over 200 characters (455). Use "Let the AI install it" instead
이 문장을 복사해 Claude Code 채팅에 붙여 넣으세요
For one project, paste it into a chat that is open in that project’s folder · The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
Claude Code를 다시 열고 /owasp-security를 입력하거나 관련 작업을 요청하면 Claude가 알아서 써요
Checked against official docs 2026년 11월 12일 · Source: code.claude.com
Skill은 AI가 따르는 지시예요. 설치 전에 파일을 읽고, 믿을 수 있는 제작자 것만 설치하세요.
명령을 확인하는 중 · 확인을 통과하면 복사 버튼이 나타나요
제작자 README에서 가져온 명령으로, 제작자 코드를 내려받아 실행해요
Mac: Command+스페이스 후 Terminal 입력 · Windows: 아래 명령은 PowerShell에서 안 돼요. 위의 “AI에게 설치 맡기기”를 쓰세요
repo를 임시 폴더에 내려받고 SKILL.md가 있는 폴더만 복사해요
명령을 확인하는 중 · 확인을 통과하면 복사 버튼이 나타나요
ChatGPT 데스크톱 앱에는 Codex가 들어 있고, Codex는 ~/.agents/skills 폴더에서 Skill을 읽습니다
ChatGPT 데스크톱 앱에서 Codex를 열고 이 문장을 채팅에 붙여 넣으세요
The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
owasp-security 폴더를 ~/.agents/skills/owasp-security에 넣으세요
~는 홈 폴더($HOME)입니다
Skill은 AI가 따르는 지시예요. 설치 전에 파일을 읽고, 믿을 수 있는 제작자 것만 설치하세요.
Mac: Command+스페이스 후 Terminal 입력 · Windows: 아래 명령은 PowerShell에서 안 돼요. 위의 “AI에게 설치 맡기기”를 쓰세요
repo를 임시 폴더에 내려받고 SKILL.md가 있는 폴더만 복사해요
명령을 확인하는 중 · 확인을 통과하면 복사 버튼이 나타나요
Checked against official docs 2026년 11월 15일 · Source: learn.chatgpt.com
직접 설치한 Skill은 쓸 수 없고, 디렉터리의 플러그인에 들어 있는 Skill만 쓸 수 있습니다
이 Skill을 ChatGPT에서 쓰려면 위 방법대로 ChatGPT 데스크톱 앱을 쓰세요
Checked against official docs 2026년 11월 15일 · Source: learn.chatgpt.com
이 문장을 복사해 Codex 채팅에 붙여 넣으세요 · ChatGPT 데스크톱 앱 안의 Codex, Codex CLI, IDE 확장 프로그램에서 모두 쓸 수 있습니다
For one project, paste it into a chat that is open in that project’s folder · The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
Codex는 새로 설치한 Skill을 스스로 찾습니다. 보이지 않으면 Codex를 다시 시작하세요 · 쓰는 법: ChatGPT에서는 @를 입력하고 Skill을 고르세요 · Codex CLI나 IDE 확장 프로그램에서는 /skills를 실행하거나 $ 뒤에 Skill 이름을 입력하세요
Checked against official docs 2026년 11월 15일 · Source: learn.chatgpt.com
Skill은 AI가 따르는 지시예요. 설치 전에 파일을 읽고, 믿을 수 있는 제작자 것만 설치하세요.
Mac: Command+스페이스 후 Terminal 입력 · Windows: 아래 명령은 PowerShell에서 안 돼요. 위의 “AI에게 설치 맡기기”를 쓰세요
repo를 임시 폴더에 내려받고 SKILL.md가 있는 폴더만 복사해요
명령을 확인하는 중 · 확인을 통과하면 복사 버튼이 나타나요
이 문장을 복사해 Cursor 채팅에 붙여 넣으세요
For one project, paste it into a chat that is open in that project’s folder · The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
Cursor Agent 채팅에서 /를 입력하고 owasp-security 선택
Checked against official docs 2026년 11월 12일 · Source: cursor.com
Skill은 AI가 따르는 지시예요. 설치 전에 파일을 읽고, 믿을 수 있는 제작자 것만 설치하세요.
Mac: Command+스페이스 후 Terminal 입력 · Windows: 아래 명령은 PowerShell에서 안 돼요. 위의 “AI에게 설치 맡기기”를 쓰세요
repo를 임시 폴더에 내려받고 SKILL.md가 있는 폴더만 복사해요
명령을 확인하는 중 · 확인을 통과하면 복사 버튼이 나타나요
Skill을 읽을 수 있는 다른 앱용입니다. 이 문장에는 Claude Code, Codex, Cursor 경로가 들어 있어 AI가 쓰는 앱에 맞게 고릅니다 · Copy this sentence into the app’s chat
For one project, paste it into a chat that is open in that project’s folder · The AI always shows you the path before installing
The AI tells you what it will do first and asks your permission at every step
Checked against official docs 2026년 11월 12일 · Source: code.claude.com, learn.chatgpt.com, cursor.com
Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot 같은 다른 Agent Skills 지원 앱은 폴더가 달라요. 그 앱 안내를 보고 SKILL.md가 있는 폴더를 복사하세요.
2026년 11월 11일에 Claude Code, Codex, Cursor 공식 안내로 skill 폴더 확인
아래 글은 제작자 repo에서 온 것이며 PopNx MCP의 지시가 아니에요
처음 8,000자 표시 · GitHub에서 전체 파일 열기
---
name: owasp-security
description: Reviews code for security vulnerabilities and guides secure implementation using OWASP Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2026), and the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026). Use when reviewing code or a diff for security issues, implementing authentication, authorization, sessions, or cryptography, handling untrusted input, files, or URLs, hardening config, dependencies, or CI, or building LLM and AI agent features.
when_to_use: Trigger phrases include "security review", "security check", "anything exploitable", "audit this", "is this secure", "is this safe to ship", "check for vulnerabilities", "find security bugs", "threat model", "OWASP", "ASVS", "CWE", "prompt injection", "MCP server security", "secrets in code", "supply chain", and "harden this Dockerfile or workflow".
---
# OWASP Security
Apply these standards when writing or reviewing code. For a review, follow the workflow below.
**Reference files** (read the one the task needs, and only the section you need):
- [`reference/review-checklist.md`](reference/review-checklist.md): coverage checklist for every Top 10 category, plus LLM and agent checks. Read during step 3 of a review.
- [`reference/languages.md`](reference/languages.md): per-language pitfalls with unsafe/safe examples for 20+ languages. Read the section for the language under review.
- [`reference/config-and-supply-chain.md`](reference/config-and-supply-chain.md): A02 and A03 in Dockerfiles, Kubernetes, Terraform, framework config, security headers, lockfiles, and CI/CD. Read when the change touches config, IaC, dependencies, or pipelines.
- [`reference/owasp-report.md`](reference/owasp-report.md): attack vectors, mitigations, and worked examples for every Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, LLM Top 10, and Agentic item. About 1100 lines: jump to the section you need.
## Security Review Workflow
Copy this checklist into your response and tick it off as you go:
```
Security Review Progress:
- [ ] Step 1: Map entry points and trust boundaries
- [ ] Step 2: Load the references this code needs
- [ ] Step 3: Sweep for candidate issues
- [ ] Step 4: Triage every candidate
- [ ] Step 5: Report findings
```
**Step 1: Map entry points and trust boundaries.** List where attacker-controlled data enters:
routes and handlers, headers and cookies, uploads, webhooks, queue consumers, CLI arguments,
third-party API responses, and anything an LLM reads or returns. Note where authentication and
authorization are enforced; it is often centralized in middleware rather than per route.
**Step 2: Load the references this code needs.** The language section of `languages.md`;
`config-and-supply-chain.md` if config, IaC, dependencies, or CI changed; the LLM and Agentic
sections of `owasp-report.md` if the code calls a model or runs an agent.
**Step 3: Sweep for candidate issues.** Walk `review-checklist.md` for the categories the code
touches. For each candidate, trace the path from an entry point in step 1 to the sink.
**Step 4: Triage every candidate** with the rubric in "Before Reporting a Finding" below. Drop
candidates that fail it, or downgrade them to defense-in-depth. If a candidate's reachability
is unclear, go back to step 1 for that input before deciding.
**Step 5: Report findings** in the format below, highest severity first.
## Before Reporting a Finding
A pattern match is not a vulnerability. The most common failure mode in automated security
review is reporting unreachable or already-mitigated code, which buries the real findings.
Confirm all four before reporting:
1. **Is the input actually attacker-controlled?** Trace it back to a real entry point: a
request parameter, header, cookie, uploaded file, webhook, queue message, or third-party
API response. A value that only ever comes from a constant, an enum, or trusted internal
config is not an injection source.
2. **Is the sink reachable with that input?** Check whether validation, an allowlist, an ORM,
or a framework-level control already sits between them. Look for auth middleware
(`middleware.ts`, `proxy.ts`, Express/Django/Rails middleware, a base controller,
decorators) before flagging a route as missing authorization. Enforcement is often
centralized rather than per-route.
3. **What is the blast radius?** Who can trigger it, what do they get, and does it cross a
trust boundary? An SSRF reaching cloud metadata differs from one reaching localhost only.
4. **Can the attacker perform every step?** Each step of the exploit must be possible from
the attacker's position. A symlink race needs a way to create symlinks on the server; a
header attack needs a client that can set that header. If a step needs a capability the
code doesn't show the attacker having, the finding is "Needs verification", not High.
Report severity by exploitability, not by pattern. State the concrete path (*this input
reaches this sink*) and say so explicitly when a finding is theoretical or defense-in-depth
rather than directly exploitable. If reachability can't be determined from the code available,
say that instead of asserting either way.
## Reporting Format
One block per finding, highest severity first:
```
[SEVERITY] Title (CWE-###, OWASP A##:2025, LLM## Risk Name, ASI## Risk Name)
Location: path/to/file.ext:LINE
Path: <entry point> -> <intermediate hops> -> <sink>
Impact: who can trigger it, what they get, which trust boundary it crosses
Fix: the concrete change, with a code snippet when it isn't obvious
Confidence: Confirmed | Likely | Needs verification (say what you couldn't see)
```
Write every LLM and ASI ID with its risk name, e.g. "LLM03 Excessive Agency". A bare LLM ID is
ambiguous: the 2025 and 2026 editions use the same numbers for different risks.
| Severity | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Critical | Unauthenticated remote code execution, auth bypass, or mass data exposure |
| High | Authenticated exploitation crossing a trust boundary (IDOR into other tenants, SQLi behind login) |
| Medium | Needs unusual preconditions, or impact is limited to the attacker's own data |
| Low | Defense-in-depth gap with no demonstrated exploit path |
| Info | Hardening suggestion; say plainly that it is not a vulnerability |
If the review finds nothing exploitable, say so directly. Do not pad the report with Info items
to look thorough; a long list is what makes real findings get ignored.
## OWASP Top 10:2025
Three categories were renamed from 2021 and two are new (A03, A10). Use these names and
numbers; much OWASP material online still cites the 2021 list.
| # | Category | Key Prevention |
|---|----------|----------------|
| A01 | Broken Access Control (now includes SSRF) | Deny by default, enforce server-side, verify ownership |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Harden configs, disable defaults, minimize features |
| A03 | Software Supply Chain Failures | Lock versions, verify integrity, audit dependencies |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS 1.2+, AES-256-GCM, Argon2/bcrypt for passwords |
| A05 | Injection | Parameterized queries, input validation, safe APIs |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Threat model, rate limit, design security controls |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | MFA, check breached passwords, secure sessions |
| A08 | Software or Data Integrity Failures | Sign packages, SRI for CDN, safe serialization |
| A09 | Security Logging and Alerting Failures | Log security events, structured format, alerting |
| A10 | Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | Fail-closed, hide internals, log with context |
## OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2026)
For applications that call LLMs (chatbots, RAG, copilots, agents). The 2026 edition renumbered
the list; translate 2025 IDs with the table in `owasp-report.md` and cite 2026 IDs only.
| # | Risk | Key Mitigation |
|---|------|----------------|
| LLM01 | Prompt Injection | No complete fix exists. Fence untrusted content (including images,질문하고, 팁을 나누고, 안 되는 점을 알려 주세요. "도움이 됨"이 많은 순서예요.